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IN DEFENSE OF SNOOPING EMPLOYERS
Jessica K. Fink*
In recent months, a plethora of states have turned their legislative
attention to protecting employee privacy in the workplace, focusing
specifically on passing state laws that protect the “social media privacy” of
individuals in their states. Indeed, discussions of workplace privacy are
everywhere nowadays: Media stories condemn employers’ efforts to
monitor their employees’ email, Internet, and telephone usage. Employees
rage about perceived invasions of their privacy. Politicians heatedly debate
how to limit employers’ prying conduct, passing laws designed to reign in
certain types of monitoring by employers. At the same time, employers
also find themselves perplexed as they grapple with how they can gather
the information that they need to make important business decisions within
an environment that views such efforts with disdain. In a world where
technological advancements have made it easier than ever to collect
massive amounts of information about those in the workforce and where
employers feel an increasing need to collect such information, looming
questions remain regarding the proper scope and limits of employees’
privacy.
This Article represents one effort to answer these questions while
taking the employers’ perspective into account, explaining both the
motivations behind and justifications for employers’ efforts to “snoop” into
their employees’ private lives. The Article describes the means through
which employers gather information about their employees, including
through some recent, rather novel approaches to collecting such data. In
addition, this Article discusses the financial, legal, and practical concerns
that motivate employers to snoop in the first place, arguing that employers
engage in this conduct for what frequently amount to very legitimate
reasons. More significantly, this article places substantial responsibility for
employer snooping with the courts themselves, highlighting particular
decisions and doctrines that not only permit, but in fact encourage,
employers to engage in these efforts to monitor employees.
At bottom, this paper attempts to put the “problem” of employer
snooping into a broader context. While employers certainly should not
have access to every aspect of their prospective and current employees’
private lives, and while abuses of the boundaries undoubtedly exist, much
of the snooping behavior for which employers have been condemned
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represents more than just senseless meddling, but rather is part of a sound
business plan designed to protect employers, employees, and the public at
large.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2013, three members of Congress introduced legislation
aimed at barring employers from requiring or requesting that any employee
or prospective employee provide an employer with a username, password,
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or other means of accessing a private email or social media account.1 This
federal law, coming on the heels of similar legislation passed in at least ten
states2 and pending in many others,3 has been characterized as “vital to
preventing employer requests for personal accounts becoming routine.”4 In
the same vein, employees in recent years increasingly have complained
about other types of alleged intrusions by employers – intrusions involving
everything from the monitoring of telephone and email communications, to
the use of global position systems (GPS) to track employees’ whereabouts,
to the application of sophisticated technology that can record virtually
every keystroke made by an employee on his/her employer-owned
computer.5
At first blush, the outrage expressed by both workers and the public
regarding this type of employer conduct seems understandable, even
predictable: What possible reason might an employer have for needing to
delve into an employee’s social media account? Why must an employer
know the precise location of an employee at every moment of the
workday? Should there not be some areas of an employee’s life that can
remain “private,” safe from employer intrusion, even if such areas touch
upon workplace activities? Given that employers’ efforts to monitor
employees show no signs of abating, and given that the technological
means for engaging in such monitoring are only becoming more
* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2001;
B.A., University of Michigan, 1997. I am grateful to Professor Orly Lobel and the students
in her Work, Welfare and Justice Seminar at the University of San Diego School of Law for
their helpful suggestions with respect to this paper. Finally, many thanks to Camille
Gustufson for her excellent research assistance.
1. Social Networking Online Protection Act (“SNOPA”), H.R. 537, 113th Cong.
(2013). See also Michael O. Loatman, Congress May Limit Employer Access To Personal
Social Media Accounts, DAILY LAB. REP., Feb. 11, 2013 (describing the implications of the
new legislation). This actually was the second time that members of Congress had
attempted to pass legislation of this nature. Previous bills, similarly aimed at limiting
employers’ access to prospective and current employees’ email and social media account
credentials, were introduced in both the House and the Senate in spring 2012 but failed to
garner sufficient support to become law. See id.; see also Lance Whitney, Democrats to
employers: Stop asking for Facebook passwords, CNET, (May 10, 2012),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57431724-83/democrats-to-employers-stop-asking-forfacebook-passwords/ (describing a bill that seeks to stop employers from asking employees
for their personal passwords to online accounts).
2. See infra note 93.
3. See Jean Eaglesham & Michael Rothfeld, Wall Street vs. Its Employees’ Privacy,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323551004578436713224083592.html
(highlighting states’ efforts to adopt social-media privacy laws).
4. See Loatman, supra note 1.
5. See Robert Sprague, Orwell was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the
United States and its De-Evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 84
(2008) (critiquing the lack of employee privacy).
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sophisticated every day, the answers to questions like these will grow to be
increasingly more pressing in the months and years to come.
This Article attempts to provide one response to this important set of
questions, explaining both the motivations and justifications for this type of
“snooping” behavior by employers. The Article not only describes the
mechanisms typically adopted by employers to gather information about
prospective and current employees, but also argues that such intrusions by
employers in many cases are reasonable – and indeed, even prudent. This
Article will begin in Part I by providing some history and context to the
issue of employee workplace privacy, reviewing some of the relevant rights
and responsibilities of employers with respect to employee privacy.
Among other things, the Article will describe the very limited privacy
rights that are available to employees, particularly for those who work in
the private sector. In Part II, this Article will discuss the methods used by
employers to gather information about employees, and will describe how
various restrictions on conventional methods of information gathering have
led to the evolution of more unusual – and arguably more intrusive – means
of monitoring employees. While this section will generally describe a host
of tools currently used by employers to gather information about
prospective and current employees, it will pay particular attention to the
recent flurry of attention surrounding employer requests for individuals’
social media passwords. In Part III, this Article will explain why
employers are more motivated than ever to engage in snooping behavior,
laying out the financial, legal, and practical concerns that render it logical –
and even advisable – for employers to snoop. In Part IV, this argument
extends one step further, with a discussion of the role that the courts
(including the U.S. Supreme Court) have played in permitting, and even
encouraging, employers’ efforts to monitor employees. Finally, in Part V,
the Article will propose some limits on employers’ right to snoop,
articulating some responsibilities that employers should have when
engaging in any monitoring of prospective or current employees.
At bottom, this Article sets out to put the alleged “problem” of
employer snooping in a more informed context and to show that it is not
the dilemma that many represent it to be – at least, not one that requires the
heightened level of legislative attention and media hype that has emerged
in recent months and years.
While abuses of employee privacy
unquestionably exist, employers by and large are not encroaching
unreasonably into their employees’ private lives. Employers gather
information about prospective and current employees not out of some
prurient desire to delve into the personal and private aspects of their lives,
but rather out of an informed, careful, and logical consideration of the risks
associated with not acquiring such information. While advances in
technology have expanded employers’ ability to snoop, employers’ actions
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in large part have been tailored to their legitimate needs.
I.

THE LIMITED RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN A PRIVATE
SECTOR WORKPLACE6

Any discussion of workplace privacy should begin with an
understanding of one key idea: Employees in the modern American
workplace possess extremely limited privacy rights.7 Regardless of the
specific workplace setting, employers generally possess broad latitude to
scrutinize the background of potential employees and to monitor details of
current employees’ behavior.8
Employers may launch thorough
investigations into the qualifications of a job applicant, using a host of
psychological and other tests; they may conduct extensive background
checks on a potential employee; they may run Internet searches to learn as
much as possible about a potential new hire.9 With respect to current
6. While this article focuses on employer snooping within the private sector, many of
the ideas discussed herein would apply with equal force to public sector employees. Public
sector employees possess somewhat greater privacy rights than their private sector
counterparts due to application of constitutional protections to their employers’ conduct.
See Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 901,
906 (2012) (noting that private sector employees generally cannot rely upon constitutional
rights to being a privacy claim, but rather must turn to a common law privacy tort).
However, the privacy rights of even public sector employees still are fairly limited in scope.
See generally Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
277 (2012) (discussing how a heightened sense of privacy for public sector employees has
become less certain in light of recent case law, including City of Ontario v. Quon); cf. Sheila
A. Bentzen, Safe for Work? Analyzing the Supreme Court’s Standard of Privacy for
Government Employees in Light of City of Ontario v. Quon, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1283, 1286 n.5
(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that “[p]ublic employees’ privacy interests
are not necessarily different from those of private employees, but the public employment
relationship is governed by certain bodies of law, most notably the Constitution, that do not
apply to the private sector”).
7. See Sprague, supra note 5, at 84 (stating that “[e]mployees have virtually no
privacy”); see also id. at 89 (citing the “near extinction” of privacy rights for employees);
see e.g. Lindsay Noyce, Private Ordering of Employee Privacy: Protecting Employees’
Expectations of Privacy with Implied-in-Fact Contract Rights, 1 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L. F.
27, 27 (2011) (noting that “[e]mployees, perhaps irrationally, often overestimate the amount
of privacy they should expect in technological communication”).
8. See Sprague, supra note 5, at 84 (“The employer has the potential to be Big
Brother, always watching, listening, and recording.”); see also Boris Segalis, Employee
Privacy Gains in the United States, INFO. LAW GRP. (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://www.infolawgroup.com/2011/01/articles/enforcement/employee-privacy-gains-in-theunited-states/ (noting that “[t]raditionally, in the U.S., employees have enjoyed little privacy
in the workplace. With respect to workplace communications, for example, employees
generally are deemed not to have ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy.’ With some
limitations, this allows employers to freely monitor and review employee
communications”).
9. See Sprague, supra note 5, at 84 (enumerating the monitoring and screening tools

556

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:2

employees, employers examine everything from employees’ Internet,
telephone, and email usage, to the keystrokes that they enter into their
computers, to the coworkers with whom they socialize, to the number and
length of the bathroom breaks that they take throughout the day.10 As one
commentator in this area has observed: “What is allowed to be monitored
and what can be done with the monitoring . . . ? The answer seems to be
that an employer can monitor virtually anything, and almost anything can
be done with it.”11
While employers do enjoy relative freedom to snoop into the private
lives of potential and current employees, there is a hodgepodge of federal
and state laws (and, in some limited cases, constitutional provisions12) that
establish some boundaries for employers in this context.13 The primary
federal law that impacts employee privacy in the workplace is the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),14 which consists
of two parts: the Wiretap Act (Title I)15 and the Stored Communications
Act (Title II).16 The Wiretap Act has a rather limited application to
that are available and used by employers for both applicants and current employees, ranging
from video and electronic surveillance to internet tracking and keylogging).
10. Id.
11. Karin Mika, The Benefit of Adopting Comprehensive Standards of Monitoring
Employee technology Use in the Workplace, CORNELL HR REV. (Sept. 22, 2012),
http://www.cornellhrreview.org/the-benefit-of-adopting-comprehensive-standards-ofmonitoring-employee-technology-use-in-the-workplace/.
12. See generally Kim, supra note 6 (citing the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable search and seizure); Secunda, supra note 6 (noting the Fourth Amendment
guarantee for public employees); Bentzen, supra note 6 (discussing constitutional provisions
impacting employees’ right to privacy).
13. For a more thorough summary of the current state of the law in this area, including the
privacy protections proposed in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW (Tentative Draft
No. 6, 2013), see Secunda, supra note 6 (discussing developments in employment privacy
law, including under the context of a newly drafted Chapter 7 of the RESTATEMENT); see
also Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century
Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L. J. 285, 290-301 (2011) (discussing
the indirect ways in which the legal system provides for employee privacy); Sprague, supra
note 5, at 93-111 (noting that the “legal right to privacy in the United States” is provided in
the “common law, constitutional law, and federal statutes.”); Jill L. Rosenberg, Conference
Presentation, Is Big Brother Watching: Monitoring Employee Communications and
Employee Privacy, AM. BAR ASS’N LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW CONFERENCE, 409
(2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2010/annu
alconference/171.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing theories used in privacy rights litigation,
while providing and suggesting procedures that can be used by employers to minimize
belief among employees that their privacy rights are being violated according to the laws of
both federal and selected state jurisdictions);
14. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1851, 1859 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511 (2006)).
15. Id. at § 2511(1).
16. Id.at § 2701.
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concerns regarding employee workplace privacy, since it prohibits only the
interception of electronic communications while in transmission.17 Most
modern communications only are “in transmission” for a matter of seconds,
minimizing the opportunities for interception.18
The Stored
Communications Act, however, has a more significant application to
workplace monitoring, since it prohibits unauthorized access to
communications while in electronic storage.19 Indeed, in enacting the
Stored Communications Act, Congress’ intent was to provide protection to
individuals’ emails and text messages20 – both of which represent fertile
areas of employer monitoring.21
Despite these protections, however, the ECPA contains several
significant exceptions that allow for employer monitoring under certain
circumstances: Under the “consent exception,” an employer can engage in
monitoring if one of the parties to a communication consents to
monitoring.22 Under the “course of business exception,” an employer can
engage in monitoring that occurs in its normal course of business, such as
by intercepting phone calls on telephone equipment used in the employer’s
ordinary course of business.23 Under a third exception, the “provider
exception,” an employer that provides wire or electronic communications
services can retrieve information stored on its system, if such access is
necessary to protect its rights as the provider of this electronic service.24
Thus, an employer that provides an email or voicemail system to its
employees can, under this exception, freely access information from that
voicemail or email system.
17. See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 291-93 (discussing the applicability of the
Wiretap Act and noting that the vast majority of modern electronic communications are only
considered to be “in transmission” for mere seconds prior to arrival at their final
destinations).
18. Id.
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006) (stating that an individual who intentionally
accesses a “wire or electronic communication while it is still in electronic storage in such a
system” will be subject to punishment).
20. See Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 438 (observing that “Congress enacted the ECPA
to make the already existing Federal Wiretap Act . . . applicable to newly emerging
communication devices”); see also Ciocchetti, supra note 13,, at 291-92 (stating that “[t]he
ECPA was intended to extend privacy protection from wire communications such as
telephone calls, to electronic communications such as e-mails and text messages”).
21. See infra note 56.
22. See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 293 (listing exceptions to the ECPA).
23. See id. (listing exceptions to the ECPA); see also Sprague, supra note 5, at 116-17
(stating that a business use exception to the Act exists, where employers are allowed to
monitor calls for “telephone equipment used in the ordinary course of business”).
24. See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 293 (noting that exceptions exist under multiple
conditions, including consent, course of business, and “exception for employers that access
stored information, if such access is necessary to protect its rights or property as the
provider of the electronic service”).
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A second federal statute that might impact employer monitoring at
work is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”),25 which prohibits
“knowingly access[ing] a computer without authorization or exceeding
authorized access.”26 The CFAA, however, is not likely to apply to
employee monitoring in any significant way. Most courts interpreting this
statute have held that the scope of an individual’s authorization to access a
computer network should be analyzed according to “expected norms of
intended use.”27 Because most employers are authorized to access
computer networks that are their own property, this statute more typically
applies “when employees or competitors hack into an employer’s system to
discover confidential information.”28
In addition to these federal statutory protections (as well as legislative
efforts by some states),29 common law “invasion of privacy” principles also
might provide some protection against employer intrusions. Employees
may bring a tort claim alleging an unlawful “intrusion upon seclusion” by
showing that an employer intruded into “a place or property where [the
employee possessed] a reasonable expectation of privacy,” and by
establishing that this intrusion “would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.”30 Many employees, however, may have difficulty showing a
reasonable expectation of privacy in areas monitored by their employer,
particularly where monitoring takes place on or within the employer’s
property.31 Indeed, courts will find liability for an intrusion upon seclusion

25. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) (outlining the circumstances that constitute an
unauthorized use of a computer and detailing the consequences for an individual who is in
violation of the CFAA).
26. See id. (defining what constitutes a violation of the CFFA).
27. Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting the
difficult balance that employers must maintain between protecting the interests of their
company and ensuring the privacy of employees and noting the response of the American
legal system to this issue, explaining the context and implications for acts such as the
CFFA).
28. Id. One additional source of statutory protection for employees can be found in
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006)
(stipulating that employers may not interfere with employees’ right to engage in concerted
activities). Some have argued that certain types of surveillance by an employer constitute
this type of unlawful interference because such conduct might “chill” employees’ exercise
of their right to engage in concerted activities. See supra notes 15-16 (prohibiting the
interception of and access to certain communications).
29. See, e.g., Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 294-98 (describing analogous state
legislation).
30. See id. at 299 (describing how employees can use common law and “invasion of
privacy” torts as some protection against employer monitoring); see also Secunda, supra
note 6, at 294-95 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining the elements of intrusion
upon seclusion).
31. See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 300 (describing how the court may have applied
the RESTATEMENT to the Trotti case.).
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tort only where an employer invades very private locations, such as
employee locker rooms or restrooms.32 Accordingly, the common law –
like its statutory counterparts – remains of minimal use to employees
seeking protection from employer prying.33
II.

PRACTICAL AND LEGAL HURDLES AFFECTING
EMPLOYERS’ ABILITY TO SNOOP

As noted above, the “right to privacy” at work exists as a rather
illusory right, particularly for private sector workers. Employers possess
significant latitude when it comes to gathering information about both
prospective and current workers. This freedom to snoop, however, is not
without any limits: While employers, in theory, possess an unfettered right
to poke around in their employees’ private lives, various practical and legal
obstacles may hinder employers’ ability to use certain methods of gathering
information.
A.

Limits Associated with Traditional Tools for Information Gathering

Employers face several restrictions with respect to their ability to
research the backgrounds of both prospective and current employees,
including limitations with respect to methods that traditionally have been
used in the workplace. For example, while popular media frequently
depicts the polygraph (i.e., lie detector) test as a common method of testing
an individual’s veracity, the federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act of
1988 effectively bars employers from using a polygraph test to screen
either job applicants or current employees, except in very limited
situations.34 Similarly, while employers may want information regarding a
32. Id. at 301.
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2013) also proposes
some privacy protections for private sector workers, including a newly named tort of
“wrongful employer intrusion upon [a] protected employee privacy interest.” See Secunda,
supra note 6, at 295-96 (noting and detailing the changes in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
EMP’T LAW (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2013) recognizing wrongful employer intrusion and
defining it).
34. See Ian Byrnside, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers
Using Social Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445,
451 (2008) (noting that employers are increasingly monitoring job applicants’ social media
pages and observing that this leads to a gray area of the law, as employers have previously
had legal ramifications for using certain methods to investigate an applicant’s criminal
history or financial status, using the EPPA as an example.); see also Stephen F. Befort, PreEmployment Screening and Investigation: Navigating Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 14
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 365, 401-02 (1997) (noting that more than half of all states have
enacted statutes similar to the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, many with restrictions
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potential or current employee’s drug usage or medical status, both federal
and state laws may limit employers’ ability to conduct medical and/or drug
testing as part of the hiring process,35 as well as with current employees.36
Employers wanting to explore a potential employee’s credit history will
have to comply with specific requirements under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act,37 and those wishing to check applicants’ criminal records may run
afoul of federal and/or state antidiscrimination statutes.38
In addition to the above-described tools, employers for many years
relied on a battery of honesty tests, personality tests, and other
psychological examinations in screening potential (and sometimes current)
employees.39 These examinations attempt to gauge an individual’s integrity
and/or assess the individual’s psychological state by measuring traits such
as the applicant’s potential for violence, propensity for addiction, and
reaction to figures of authority.40 Yet, these tests also create both legal and
practical challenges for employers. Certain types of questions on these
exams may violate federal and/or state antidiscrimination principles,
particularly where questions inquire into a candidate’s religious beliefs or
sexual practices.41 These tests also have proven to be of questionable
even more stringent than those established by federal law).
35. See Byrnside, supra note 34, at 451-452 (noting the EPPA restriction on polygraph
tests and the ADA restrictions on medical examinations and drug testing); see also Befort,
supra note 34, at 392-99 (describing limitations on testing in both the private and public
sectors).
36. See Rochelle B. Ecker, To Catch a Thief: The Private Employer’s Guide to Getting
and Keeping an Honest Employee, 63 UMKC L. REV. 251, 272 (1994) (discussing state
legislation that limits employers’ use of employee drug testing); see also Lisa Guerin,
Workplace Testing: What Your Employer May Require, NOLO, available at
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/workplace-testing-employer-requirements29496.html (delineating the legality of various workplace testing methods).
37. See Byrnside, supra note 34, at 450-51 (comparing the difficulties an employer
may legally have monitoring an employee’s social media page to the potential legal
challenges an employer faces when looking into an employee’s financial history.).
38. See id. at 450 (noting that employment decisions based on criminal records must be
“consistent with ‘business necessity’ and [must] not have a disparate impact on a certain
class of applicants”).
39. See Susan J. Stabile, The Use of Personality Tests as a Hiring Tool: Is the Benefit
Worth the Cost?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 279-80 (2002) (exploring the effectiveness
and privacy issues surrounding use of personality tests as a hiring technique).
40. See Befort, supra note 34, at 402-03 (describing the use of personality tests by
employers to discover certain characteristics about a potential employee and noting the
regulations against using a polygraph test on a potential employee); see also Stabile, supra
note 39, at 283-85 (discussing the factors giving rise to the widespread use of personality
tests).
41. See Befort, supra note 34, at 402-04 (describing the EPPA restriction on polygraph
tests for hiring purposes as well as additional state legislation restricting polygraph use); see
also Stabile, supra note 39, at 286-88 (describing the extent to which the Americans with
Disabilities Act may limit employers’ ability to administer certain types of personality
tests); see also Stabile, supra note 39, at 289-98 (describing a variety of flaws in the
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utility and reliability, largely because they “measure intangible qualities
such as intelligence and ability to be truthful,” thus injecting subjectivity
into the scoring of the examinations and producing inconsistent and
untrustworthy results.42 Thus, even to the extent that an employer ventures
to utilize these tools, the information gathered as a result may be of little
utility.
Faced with these obstacles in gathering information on their own, yet
hungry for data about prospective employees in particular, many employers
have turned to another seemingly reliable source for learning about
potential new hires: soliciting reference information from a candidate’s
former employers. Yet, here too, employers frequently encounter barriers.
In theory, employers possess significant latitude to provide reference
information regarding a former employee, even where the reference will
include negative information.43 In order to encourage employers to share
an accurate assessment of a former worker’s abilities, the law grants
employers a “qualified privilege” to communicate information to a
prospective employer as part of a reference request.44 Under this qualified
privilege, an employer may not be held legally liable for the contents of a
response to a reference request (i.e., through a defamation suit) so long as
he or she does not communicate false information about an employee “with
malice” – a term that different courts will define in different ways.45
Despite this potential protection, however, many employers remain
wary of providing reference information. Employers fear the cost of
having to litigate an expensive defamation suit to prove the existence of the
qualified privilege if they do provide negative information about a former
employee.46 Moreover, employers worry that providing even positive
accuracy of personality tests to screen applicants).
42. See Ecker, supra note 36, at 260 (noting the issues with using personality tests and
honesty tests and observing a recent California court ruling that the use of the former was
difficult to justify); see also Stabile, supra note 39, at 297 (noting that many who have
studied these tests have expressed “real concern about both the reliability and validity of
personality tests”); see also Stabile, supra note 39 at 289-98 (describing the faults of
personality tests).
43. See Stabile, supra note 39, at 283-84 (discussing employers’ capacity to provide
reference information).
44. See Befort, supra note 34, at 407 (describing the restrictions on a former employer
when providing information about an employee to a prospective employer).
45. Id. at 408. While some courts apply a common law standard for malice, requiring
“a showing of actual ill will or intent to [harm] the plaintiff,” other courts use an “actual
malice” standard, which “requires a plaintiff to prove that [a] statement was made with
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of [its truth or falsity].” See id. at 408
(internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the standards used to determine if a former
employer has exceeded its legal boundaries when providing information about an employee
to a prospective employer).
46. See John Ashby, Employment References: Should Employers Have an Affirmative
Duty to Report Employee Misconduct to Inquiring Prospective Employers?, 46 ARIZ. L.
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information about a former worker may lead to trouble down the road,
since employers may face exposure for negligent misrepresentation if an
employee who received a positive reference subsequently exhibits violence
or otherwise harms a member of the public.47 Accordingly, confronted
with this difficult decision regarding what information about a former
employee should be provided to a prospective employer, many employers
simply refuse to provide any substantive information at all, limiting
reference information to the employee’s dates of employment, positions
held, final pay, and certain other objectively-verifiable information.48
Others entirely refuse to respond to reference requests.49
B.

The Rise in More Creative Tools for Information Gathering

Thus, when it comes to using traditional tools for gathering
information about both prospective and current employees, many
employers find themselves stymied in their efforts. At the same time,
however, employers are under increasing pressure to gather information
about their workers – both about prospective employees and about those
who currently are employed.50 Accordingly, faced with an increasing
concern for gathering information and a decreasing ability to use traditional
methods to do so, many employers have adopted more novel approaches
for obtaining the data that they need.
Almost as a matter of course nowadays, employers use the Internet to
gather information about prospective and current employees, taking
advantage of the massive amounts of newly available information to assist

REV. 117, 118 (2004) (using a hypothetical about a potentially violent former employee to
illustrate the precarious situation the employer is faced with when the violent employee’s
prospective employer calls for a reference); see also Stabile, supra note 39, at 283-84
(noting the impact of cost on employers’ perceived threat of suit).
47. See Ashby, supra note 46, at 118 (describing the difficult decisions an employer
must make and factors they must consider when providing a reference to a prospective
employer).
48. Id. at 119; see also Fact Sheet 16: Employment Background Checks: A Jobseeker’s
Guide, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (November 2013), available at
https://www.privacyrights.org/content/employment-background-checks-jobseekers-guide
(observing that while “[a] former boss can say anything truthful about your performance
[but] most employers have a policy to only confirm dates of employment, final salary, and
other limited information”).
49. Ashby, supra note 46,, at 119 ; see also Susan J. Wells, No, Not That John Gotti,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 1998),
http://theater.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/10/circuits/articles/22chec.html (observing that
“[m]any employers have adopted a policy of giving only basic information when asked for
references on former employees because they fear lawsuits”).
50. See infra Section III (discussing why employers seek to gather information on their
employees).
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them in their hiring decisions.51 A 2009 survey by CareerBuilder.com
reported that 45% of the 2600 hiring personnel surveyed stated that they
viewed candidates’ social networking sites as part of the hiring process.52
Additional studies have reported that at least 75% of recruiters and/or
employers use some type of Internet searching as part of the applicant
screening process.53 Even behemoth employers like Microsoft – a company
that presumably has a wealth of resources that it could devote to the hiring
process – cites social media research as a now-typical part of its hiring
process.54 As more and more data about potential workers becomes
available on the Internet, and as these types of online tools become
increasingly more sophisticated, employers likely will utilize these tools at
an ever-growing pace.
Technology also has made it substantially easier for employers to
monitor their current employees’ activities.55 For example, employers may
monitor current employees’ Internet usage or email communications,
particularly when the employee is using an employer-provided computer or
using the employers’ server for this activity.56 If employees are using a
cellular phone provided by the employer, the employer may examine their
text messages, voicemails, and/or listen in on their telephone
conversations.57 Employers may record the keystrokes made by the
51. Byrnside, supra note 34, at 446-47; see also id. at 456 (citing a “growing trend
among employers to conduct online background checks of job applicants by searching their
MySpace and/or Facebook profiles”); see also Margaret Keane et al., Social Networking:
New Risks of Familiar Liabilities, in PRIVACY & DATA SEC. LAW 2011, 87, 93 (PLI
Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. G-1049, 2011) (observing that “[e]mployers
are increasingly and routinely using the Internet to conduct background research on
applicants and employees to use in making employment decisions”); see also Wendy S.
Lazar & Lauren E. Schwartzreich, Employee Privacy Rights: Limitations to Monitoring,
Surveillance and Other Technological Searches in the Private Workplace, in EMP’T
DISCRIMINATION L. & LITIG., 373, 378 (PLI Litig. & Admin., Prac. Course Handbook Ser.
No. H-860, 2011) (stating that “[h]uman resource professionals turn increasingly to social
media for background information on candidates”).
52. See Lazar & Schwartzreich, supra note 51, at 378 (citing the aforementioned
survey, in which over 600 human resource and recruiting professionals participated).
53. See Byrnside, supra note 34, at 456 (discussing several studies that have shown
over 75% of employers using the internet to research job applicants); see also Ciocchetti,
supra note 13, at 285 n.2 (noting that “the majority of employers monitor the electronic
activities of their employees in some form or another”).
54. See Byrnside, supra note 34, at 456 (discussing Microsoft’s use of social media in
screening job applicants).
55. See Kim, supra note 6, at 913 (noting that “[w]hile employers have always had an
interest in monitoring their employees’ activities, technological change has increased both
the incentives and means to do so”).
56. See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 307-09, 312-14 (discussing corporate practices in
monitoring employee email, text messages, and computer usage as well as the practice of
“Internet Clickstream Monitoring”).
57. Id. at 307-09, 320-21; see also Lazar & Schwartzreich, supra note 51, at 377

564

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:2

employee at his/her computer and track the searches conducted by the
employee via Internet search engines.58 Indeed, this type of monitoring has
become commonplace in the workplace. A recent study by the American
Management Association found that 66% of employers monitor their
employees’ website activities.59 43% of employers review their employees’
email and 40% analyze the contents of outbound email communications.60
45% of employers track the content, keystrokes, and time that employees
spend at their keyboards.61 45% of employers monitor the time spent by
employees on telephone calls and/or the numbers called by employees and
another 16% of employers record employees’ telephone conversations.62
An additional 10% of employers monitor employees’ voicemail
messages.63
Employer monitoring also extends beyond examining computer and
telephone usage, involving even more novel methods of tracking
employees’ activities. Many employers also may use “access panels” in
the workplace—electronic devices that control entry into a doorway,
stairwell, elevator, or other restricted area.64 Individuals wishing to enter
these restricted areas must provide a password, swipe an identification
card, or utilize fingerprint or iris identification.65 These access panels not
only provide employers with workplace security by preventing
unauthorized individuals from entering certain areas, but also can allow
employers to track employee behavior.66 By placing access panels on
restroom or break room doors, for example, employers can monitor
whether and to what extent employees utilize such facilities.67 Employers
(discussing companies’ recent tendencies to request access to employees’ private
communications through wireless cell phone services); Kim, supra note 6, at 902.
58. See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 315-16, 320 (discussing the practice of keystroke
monitoring and search engine monitoring).
59. See 2007 Electronic Monitoring and Surveillance Survey, AMA/ePolicy Institute
Research, Feb. 8, 2008, cited in Carlin, infra note 102, n.9 (noting the percentages of
employers that stated in an AMA survey that they review their employees’ email contents,
keystrokes, and time spent on keyboards, and that have fired employees for internet misuse).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 302 (discussing the use of security access panels
that require an input from employees in order to enter certain areas of an employer’s
facility).
65. See id. (discussing the various inputs used for access panels).
66. See id. at 303 (discussing the dual use of access panels for both security and
employee monitoring).
67. See id. (discussing potential patterns employers would monitor for employee
movement using access panels). On a related (but somewhat more extreme) note, some
employers may use technology to monitor whether employees actually wash their hands
when using the restroom at work; see also id. at 303-04 n.63 (discussing how at least one
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similarly have used global position systems (GPS) and Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) to monitor the location of their employees and
property.68 These systems can track employees’ specific location within a
workplace at any given time, and also provide accurate reports on
employees’ productivity by compiling data regarding the speed at which
employees are working.69 While these technological advances are
relatively new with respect to their use in the workplace (thus rendering
their legal status somewhat in flux),70 they too represent an area where
technological advancements have allowed employers to delve even further
into areas once viewed as private.71
As employers have stepped up their use of creative methods for
gathering information about employees, one tactic in particular has
captured the attention of the public, the media, and governmental actors. In
recent years, some employers have requested (or in some cases, insisted)
that prospective and/or current employees provide the employers with
access to their social media sites.72 For example, in 2010, the Maryland
Department of Corrections asked an employee who was returning to his
company has invested in a device that will detect when an individual enters a restroom,
identify whether that individual is an employee, and confirm whether that employee
activates the soap dispenser while in the room. If the employee fails to activate the soap
dispenser during the visit to the restroom, then a notification is provided within the room to
remind that individual that hand washing is required).
68. See id. at 310 (discussing the use of RFID to physically track employees); see also
Jennifer L. Parent, Advising Clients on Today’s Top Employment Law Issues, in ASPATORE
THOUGHT LEADERSHIP, EMPLOYMENT LAW 2013: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY
STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR *2 (2013) (discussing the use of GPS to physically
track employees).
69. See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 310 (noting that RFID tracking can generate realtime monitoring of employee location within the workplace).
70. See Parent, supra note 68, at *2 (discussing a Supreme Court case that reversed a
criminal conviction for a failure of law enforcement to get a warrant before using GPS to
track a suspect, noting a best practice of informing employees of tracking policies, and
discussing federal cases dealing with the ownership of social media pages); see also
Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 311-12 (noting that requiring employees to swallow RFID
chips is illegal in several states).
71. Ironically, this use of technology to “push the envelope” regarding the bounds of
employee privacy in some cases may work to the detriment of the employer. Employees
also increasingly are becoming savvy about the extent to which technology can assist them
in various workplace situations. See, e.g., David Koeppel, The Secret Spy Living in Your
iPhone, THE FISCAL TIMES, July 28, 2011 (describing employee’s use of blackberry device
to record conversation with a superior during a negative performance review); see also id.
(discussing one plaintiff attorney’s observation that more than 50% of her potential clients
possess some type of digital evidence with respect to their claims).
72. See Debra Donston-Miller, Facebook Password Debate Stirs Deep Social Fears,
INFO. WEEK (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://www.informationweek.com/thebrainyard/news/social_networking_consumer/2327003
04/facebook-password-debate-stirs-deep-social-fears (discussing Facebook’s reaction to
employers requesting access to employees’ Facebook pages).
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position as a security guard following a leave of absence to provide the
Department of Corrections with his social media login and password.73
According to the Department of Corrections, this request was made in
order to check for any gang affiliations by the employee.74 In another
instance, a New York statistician interviewing for a new position was asked
to provide his prospective employer access to his Facebook page.75
Various municipal employers also have put these types of policies in place,
requiring certain employees – most frequently those working in a security
or law enforcement capacity – to provide their employers with access to
their personal social media sites as a condition of employment.76
Even if an employer does not ask a prospective or current employee
for their social media login credentials, employers can gain access to these
websites through a variety of other methods. In some cases, employers
may ask applicants or employees to log on to a social media site in the
presence of an employer representative. This allows the employer to
review the contents of the site at that time (a practice known as “shoulder
surfing”).77 In other cases, the employer may ask the employee to “friend”
a staff member of the employer, thereby allowing that individual access to
the information on the social media site.78 Finally, some employers utilize
third party applications that can scour and collect some of the information
73. Manuel Valdes & Shannon McFarland, Employers asking job applicants for
Facebook passwords, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 20, 2012, available at
http://news.yahoo.com/employers-ask-job-seekers-facebook-passwords-170500338.html;
see also Emil Protalinski, Employer demands Facebook login credentials during interview,
ZDNET (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/employer-demands-facebooklogin-credentials-during-interview/327 (discussing ACLU’s representation of the
aforementioned job applicant); Leslie Horn, Employers Asking Applicants for Facebook
Passwords, PC MAG. (Mar. 17, 2012),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2401254,00.asp.
74. See Protalinski, supra note 73 (discussing the Maryland Department of
Corrections’ reasons for asking for the aforementioned job applicant’s Facebook password).
75. See Valdes & McFarland, supra note 73 (discussing a job applicant’s refusal to
provide a potential employer with his Facebook password).
76. See Horn, supra note 73 (discussing various situations wherein employers have
asked for applicants’ Facebook passwords); see also Walter M. Stella, The Importance of
Compliance with Employment Law in an Ever-Changing, High-Tech Era, in ASPATORE
THOUGHT LEADERSHIP, EMPLOYMENT LAW 2011: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY
STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR *5 (2011) (discussing the potential legal implications
of using social media to monitor employees).
77. See Horn, supra note 73 (describing “shoulder surfing” and noting that it is a
violation of Facebook’s own terms of use); see also Valdes & McFarland, supra note 73
(defining “shoulder surfing”).
78. See Valdes & McFarland, supra note 73 (noting that employers are using various
measures to monitor their employees’ Facebook pages); see also Marie-Andree Weiss, The
Use of Social Media Sites Data by Business Organizations in their Relationship with
Employees, J. INTERNET L., Aug. 2011, at 16, 23 (stating that while becoming a friend just to
“spy” on one’s employee may be legal, it may also raise ethics issues).
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from an individual’s Facebook profile.79
Predictably, many have denounced this practice as a dramatic
overreach by employers. According to one commentator – a law professor
and former federal prosecutor – “[i]t’s akin to requiring someone’s house
keys . . ., an egregious privacy violation.”80 In the words of another
observer, “Would we let a potential employer walk around our houses,
opening drawers, looking at our letters, checking our diaries, little
blackbooks, and contents of our liquor cabinets? I think not.”81 The
sponsor of an unsuccessful 2012 Senate bill aimed at outlawing this
practice referred to these employer requests for social media credentials as
“an unreasonable and intolerable invasion of privacy.” 82 Even the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has involved itself in fighting this
practice.83
79. See Torie Bosch, Can Legislation Preventing Employers From Requesting
Facebook Passwords Really Protect Privacy, SLATE (Mar. 28, 2012, 4:20 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/03/28/employers_don_t_have_to_request_fac
ebook_passwords_to_invade_applicants_privacy_.html (discussing legislation to protect
employee privacy); Joshua Brustein, Keeping a Closer Eye on Employees’ Social
Networking,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
26,
2010,
6:51
PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/keeping-a-closer-eye-on-workers-socialnetworking/ (describing a new software that monitors an employee’s social media accounts
for their employer); Valdes & McFarland, supra note 73 (enumerating additional strategies
employers use to monitor employees’ social media pages).
80. See Valdez & McFarland, supra note 73 (discussing the measures employers take
to monitor an employee’s social media page).
81. See Donston-Miller, supra note 72 (describing a movement advocating for
consequences for employers who violate their employees’ privacy through social media
sites).
82. See Whitney, supra note 1 (describing proposed legislation to restrict employers
from requesting an employee’s social media information).
83. See Horn, supra note 73 (noting the ACLU’s opposition to “shoulder surfing”); see
also Emil Protalinski, ACLU: Employers Demanding Facebook Passwords Is Privacy
Invasion (Mar. 22, 2012, 10:24 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/aclu-employersdemanding-facebook-passwords-is-privacy-invasion/10693 (quoting an ACLU attorney’s
statement that “[i]t’s an invasion of privacy for private employers to insist on looking at
people’s private Facebook pages as a condition of employment or consideration in an
application process. . . . People are entitled to their private lives”). Interestingly, while
Facebook’s Chief Privacy Officer previously claimed that requesting employees’ and
applicants’ login information would violate the company’s terms of use, indicating that
Facebook might take legal action against employers engaged in this practice, the company
has not yet taken any legal action against any employer and may have backtracked with
respect to this position. See Bosch, supra note 79 (discussing attempts to introduce bills to
protect employee privacy); Anne Fisher, Must You Give a Job Interviewer Your Facebook
Password?, CNN MONEY (Mar. 28, 2012, 12:08 PM)
http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2012/03/28/facebook-password-job-interview/
(instructing applicants on declining to give social media password information to a
prospective employer during an interview); Shel Israel, The Great Facebook Employee
Password Non-issue, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2012, 8:32 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/shelisrael/2012/03/25/the-great-facebook-employee-password-
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Yet other observers have criticized the apparent hysteria that has
surrounded this issue. According to these commentators, requests for
social media credentials represent nothing more than “a few clumsy
missteps by socially backward organizations, or even legitimate steps in the
vetting of candidates for positions that would require high security
clearance.”84 According to one reporter who has studied this issue, “on
closer examination it turns out there have been very few reported instances
of privacy abuse and none of them seem to have happened very recently.”85
According to this reporter, virtually all reported cases of individuals being
asked to turn over password information involve government positions
(primarily public safety jobs), and all occurred more than one year ago. 86
This reporter could not find an example of a private sector employer
demanding a prospective or current employee’s social media password.87
Thus, while valid objections to this practice may exist, there is scant
evidence to indicate any threat of employers demanding social media
passwords or similar information on a broad scale.
Moreover, employers have valid reasons for wanting access to this
information. Some employers, particularly those in a public safety or
similar field, may want to check for security risks associated with hiring or
retaining a particular worker.88 Employers likewise may want to review an
employee’s social media web site(s) to gather important information about
an employee’s judgment that might not otherwise be available to an
employer.89 Finally, some employers may use employees’ social media
credentials to more specifically measure an employee’s potential for
success in a position. Indeed, at least one recent study has concluded that
checking a candidate’s Facebook profile may be the best predictor of that
candidate’s success within a company – significantly more accurate than
nonissue/ (arguing that the media is exaggerating privacy invasions surrounding employees’
social media activity).
84. See Donston-Miller, supra note 72 (observers have argued that “when you break
down the events, this issue is nothing but a tempest in a teapot”).
85. See Israel, supra note 83 (discussing the media’s portrayal of social media abuse by
employers).
86. See id. (noting that the threat of employers abusing social media has been
exaggerated).
87. See id. (noting that the threat of misuse of social media by employers, especially
private employers, is overstated).
88. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (describing situations where
employers may feel concerned about the implications of their employees’ social media
postings).
89. See, e.g., David Mielach, Hiring Managers Reveal Social Media Secrets, BUSINESS
NEWS DAILY (April 18, 2013), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/2377-social-mediahiring.html (hiring managers have declined to hire candidates who post inappropriate or
provocative pictures online, and/or whose social media pages include evidence of drinking
or drug use, poor communication skills, bad-mouthing of a prior employer, or making
discriminatory comments).
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even standard personality tests.90
Despite the potential benefits associated with acquiring an applicant’s
or employee’s social media credentials, and the relatively limited scope in
which this tactic is used, politicians are responding to this practice with
predictable fervor. On the federal level, three members of Congress
recently introduced the Social Networking Online Protection Act
(“SNOPA”), designed to limit employers’ access to the login credentials of
employees’ and applicants’ social media accounts.91 The law would
impose significant fines on employers that request or require any employee
or applicant to provide the employer with a username, password or other
means of accessing a private email or social media account, as well as on
employers that retaliate against individuals who refuse to provide such
information.92 This legislation follows on the heels of successful efforts by
several states to regulate this area.93 Indeed, on the state level, this type of
legislation has become something of a trend: A recent report by the
National Conference of State Legislatures asserts that social media privacy
legislation has been introduced or is in the process of being implemented in
thirty-five states since the start of 2013.94 As states inevitably jump on this
bandwagon, and as federal lawmakers continue to contemplate their own
pending legislation, employers are on the verge of losing a powerful tool in
their information-gathering arsenal.
90. See Horn, supra note 73 (citation omitted) (describing “shoulder surfing” and
identifying employers’ motivation to “shoulder surf”).
91. See Loatman, supra note 1 (describing various states’ proposed legislation to
prevent employers from violating employees’ privacy rights by monitoring their social
media).
92. See id. (discussing “SNOPA” and proposed social media privacy legislation in
different states). Notably, this legislation represents Congress’s second attempt to regulate
in this area. Virtually identical legislation was introduced in Congress in 2012 but failed to
become law. Id. See also Whitney supra note 1 (discussing possible legislative action to
combat social media abuse by employers).
93. Maryland, Illinois, California, Michigan, New Mexico, Utah, Arkansas,
Washington, Colorado and New Jersey have already enacted legislation that limits employer
access to social media accounts. See Loatman supra note 1 (noting progress that has been
made in legislation that restricts employer access to employees’ social media sites); see also
Joseph J. Lazzarotti, More states limit employer access to employee social media accounts,
LEXOLOGY (May 23, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7f39acc0-6ca148be-a4f9-a3348c8d9cf3 (detailing new legislation in states to protect employees privacy);
Arkansas Enacts Employer, School Social Media Privacy Protection Laws, DAILY LABOR
REPORT NO. 82, Apr. 29, 2013, at A-8 (describing Arkansas’s new law to restrict both
employers’ and higher education institutions’ access to prospective students’ and
employees’ social media password information); Lorraine McCarthy, New Jersey Governor
Signs Bill Limiting Employer Access to Social Media Accounts, DAILY LABOR REPORT NO.
168, Aug. 29, 2013, at A-10 (noting a recent law passed in New Jersey prohibiting
employers from requiring prospective or current employees to give employers their social
media passwords).
94. Eaglesham & Rothfeld, supra note 3.

570

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW
III.

[Vol. 16:2

EMPLOYER MOTIVATIONS FOR SNOOPING: WHY
EMPLOYERS SNOOP

Employers have adopted a broad range of methods to gather
information about prospective and/or current employees. But why are
employers so fixated on gathering this information in the first place? Why
do employers care about who employees might associate with outside of
work, or about what an individual might post on his/her social media page,
or about the specific internet sites visited by a (presumably otherwiseproductive) employee? Some have adhered to the relatively simplistic
argument that employers choose to peek into their employees’ private lives
without any legitimate cause.
There are, however, a variety of
considerations that not only justify employers taking these intrusive steps
to investigate their workers, but also render such steps prudent and
necessary.
A.

Financial Motivations for Snooping

A host of financial considerations motivate employers to monitor their
employees’ behavior. These financial concerns play a large role during the
hiring process.
Given today’s competitive business environment,
employers must take every possible step to maximize gains and minimize
losses. Employers often unnecessarily waste substantial resources as part
of the hiring process. Not only is recruiting and interviewing candidates a
costly endeavor, but employers can also waste significant resources due to
poor hiring decisions – decisions which ultimately force an employer to
retrain (or replace) an employee.95 Accordingly, employers increasingly
have directed their resources toward finding an employee who represents
the best possible “fit” for a position.96
In this respect, the use of technology to snoop into a job applicant’s
background has become an indispensible part of the hiring process. As
95. See Stabile, supra note 39, at 282-83 & nn.13-14 (observing that “replacing
employees is costly” and citing statistics placing the cost of replacing one bad hire at “1.5
times the worker’s salary and benefits”) (citations omitted); see also Jay Goltz, The Hidden
Costs of Bad Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011,
http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/the-hidden-costs-of-bad-hiring/ (estimating that
two “bad hires” could cost an employer as much as $40,000 in increased unemployment
insurance expenses alone, and could run up to $200,000 if the employees’ actions resulted in
lost customers).
96. See Byrnside, supra note 34, at 448 (noting that “[e]mployers often seek as much
information as possible about job applicants to ensure the best fit between an applicant and
the employer’s organization”) (citation omitted); see generally Stabile, supra note 39, at
279-80 (discussing employers’ use of personality and other tests to eliminate applicants
possessing negative traits and determine the “fit” between an applicant and any open
position).
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noted above, employers have utilized the Internet to research candidates
with increasing frequency in recent years.97 What once may have seemed
like a significant intrusion on a job applicant’s privacy has now become an
accepted – and even expected – part of the interview process.98 In fact,
some observers have argued that “it would be irresponsible for an employer
not to conduct such easy and cost-effective due diligence before hiring or
promoting employees.”99 As this technology becomes even more costefficient in years to come, and as individuals post more and more
information online, one should expect employers to use this simple and
cost-effective screening tool with even greater frequency.100
With respect to current employees, employers possess similar
concerns regarding maximizing profitability and efficiency, and these
concerns likewise may lead employers to monitor their workers. In today’s
workplace, “incessant distractions litter workplaces and entice workers to
stray from their duties.”101 In a depressed business climate where profit
margins consistently tighten, employers have become increasingly focused
on eliminating behaviors that might detract from the bottom line.102 For
example, employers want to ensure that employees are not spending
excessive time surfing the Internet in lieu of performing their duties.
According to one report, “[e]ven minor personal Internet use in the
workplace can lead to millions in lost profits.”103 This same study
predicted that “[t]his potential loss may only get worse as the average geny’er spends upwards of thirty four percent of their time online doing
personal tasks, as opposed to the twenty five percent found in the rest of the
97. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing employers’ surveillance
of employees’ social media activities).
98. See Weiss, supra note 78, at 16 (describing results of 2009 survey which showed
that 79% of hiring managers and recruiters in the United States review online information
about prospective employees, and showing that 75% of U.S. companies surveyed have
policies requiring employees in charge of hiring to utilize online research).
99. See id. (noting the ease of accessing prospective and current employees’ social
media pages); Keane, supra note 51, at 93 (citation omitted).
100. See Byrnside, supra note 34, at 453 (observing that “[t]he more economical it
becomes to obtain information about a potential employee’s private life, the greater the
likelihood employers will use it”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 285 (citation omitted).
102. See Sprague, supra note 5, at 111 (arguing that “[o]ne significant motivation for
monitoring is performance-based, ensuring that employees are performing their work
effectively and efficiently, or at all.”) (citation omitted); see also Michael Carlin, Employers
are Watching Your Facebook: Worker Privacy Significantly Diminished in the Digital Era,
NAT’L L. F. (June 8, 2011), http://nationallawforum.com/2011/06/08/employers-arewatching-your-facebook-worker-privacy-significantly-diminished-in-the-digital-era/ (noting
that “[p]roductivity concerns also cause many employers to monitor employees”).
103. Carlin, supra note 102 (citation omitted); see also Larry Swisher, Nine of 10
Workers Accept, Like Monitoring of Computer Use by Employers, Survey Finds, DAILY
LAB. REP., May 24, 2013, at A-13 (estimating business loss due to personal computer use).
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working population.”104 Another study recently found that, for a business
with 100 employees, the time lost due to non-work-related computer
activities “is the equivalent of paying nearly seven . . .workers to do
nothing at a total cost of $385,000 per year in wages . . .”105
Employers likewise may monitor employees to avoid more direct
types of financial harm. Excessive personal use of a company’s broadband
capacity or email accounts may result in decreased productivity, costly
storage shortages, and/or slower network operations.106 Visiting social
media sites or other unsecure web sites from a company computer can
introduce data security risks like malware, phishing, or other viruses into
the employer’s computer system.107 In some cases, employers may monitor
employees to prevent seemingly mundane yet ultimately costly financial
injuries – for example, using video surveillance to prevent the theft of
office supplies or other company property.108
One final financial consideration that motivates employers to snoop
may arise out of a company’s desire to protect its trade secrets. As one
commentator observed, “[n]ew technology leads to new ways that
competitors or employees can steal confidential company information.”109
A 2010 study by a software security company found that an astonishing
104. Carlin, supra note 102, n.32 (citation omitted).
105. Swisher, supra note 103.
106. See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 286 (explaining companies’ rationale for
monitoring employee computer use) (citation omitted).
107. See Weiss, supra note 78, at 19 (detailing the ease of contracting viruses and
malware through social media links); see also Paul M. Secunda, King and Spalding’s
Surprising New Email Policy, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Apr. 22, 2013),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2013/04/king-and-spaldings-surprisingnew-email-policy.html (implementing an email policy under which firm employees are
barred from accessing any personal email accounts (i.e., anything other than the individual’s
kslaw.com email account) from any firm computer, or from any computer connected to the
firm’s computer network). In implementing its policy, King & Spalding cited advice from
both internal and outside security experts indicating that accessing personal email accounts
from firm computers could create a significant security risk to the firm and its clients. Id.
The firm further noted that “individual users who innocently click on malicious e-mails are
often the cause of security breaches.” Id.
108. See Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 322 (detailing the reasons companies employ
video surveillance in the workplace) (citation omitted); see also Alexis C. Madrigal, Dunkin
Donuts’ Employee Surveillance Cut Thefts Up to 13%, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/04/dunkin-donuts-employeesurveillance-cut-thefts-up-to-13/256152/ (asserting the broad use of video surveillance by
fast-food restaurants, which lose approximately seven percent of sales due to employee
theft); cf. Stabile, supra note 39, at 281 n.7 (citing a 1991 study that estimates the direct cost
to employers of employee theft as close to $50 billion, as well as other studies placing the
cost at $40 billion) (citations omitted).
109. Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 473-74; see also Weiss, supra note 78, at 19
(detailing the possibility of employees leaking confidential information or trade secrets
through use of social media).
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94% of users of one large social networking site readily accepted a “friend
request” from a complete stranger (who happened to be presented to them
as a pretty young woman).110 Even more shocking, when this same study
then selected twenty of the individuals who had accepted the friend request
and engaged them in real-time conversation online, 73% of the sample had
– within a mere two hours of conversation – revealed to this new “friend”
confidential information belonging to their employer, including business
strategies and information about unreleased products.111 In 2004, even
Apple – a company known for keeping its trade secrets under wraps –
discovered confidential information about unreleased products posted on a
publicly-accessible Internet bulletin board.112 The disclosure of this type of
proprietary information can cost a business hundreds of thousands of
dollars in any given year: a 2001 survey in which 138 Fortune 1000
companies reported data, the survey authors concluded that losses of
proprietary information and intellectual property ranged between $53 billon
and $59 billion in a single year.113
B.

Concerns About Liability Prevention as a Motivation for Snooping
(“Prophylactic Monitoring”)

On top of the financial incentives that might motivate an employer to
snoop, employers also may feel compelled to monitor employees as a
means of preventing legal exposure in various areas. For example, as
discussed in greater detail below,114 employees who use workplace
computers or other employer-provided equipment to browse pornographic
web sites, display sexually explicit content, or disseminate racially
insensitive material may expose their employers to liability in a harassment
or discrimination case.115 In some disturbing news for employers, some
110. Weiss, supra note 78, at 20 (citation omitted).
111. Id. (citation omitted); see also Ciocchetti, supra note 13, at 286 (stating that
“[f]ailing to monitor [employees properly may] allow rogue employees to steal trade secrets
or send out confidential information in violation of various federal and state laws”)
(citations omitted).
112. Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 474.
113. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL., TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS
1 (2002), available at www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/issues/technology/files/
informationloss2.pdf. Notably, an entire cottage industry has arisen to take advantage of
these types of concerns. One online communication services company recently launched a
new type of software, called Social Sentry, designed to help employers monitor their
employees’ Facebook and Twitter accounts, with one focus being to help employers watch
for the release of confidential or embarrassing information. See Brustein, supra note 79
(describing Teneros’ social media monitoring service).
114. See infra Section IV.B.1 (discussing the incentives of utilizing employee computer
surveillance to avoid liability for hostile workplace claims).
115. See Kim, supra note 6, at 913 (observing that “employers now also fear that
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studies have indicated that over 20% of all email users have received
sexually explicit email in the workplace.116 Similarly, employees may
abuse their employer’s email system through a practice called “spoofing”—
intentionally sending messages that appear to be from someone else—in
order to harass the recipient or otherwise disseminate an inappropriate
message.117 In either circumstance, these inappropriate emails or other
Internet activities can form the basis of harassment or other lawsuits against
an employer.118 By monitoring employees’ use of the employer’s Internet
and email systems, an employer may be able to learn of—and eliminate—
such inappropriate usage before it can create a hostile environment or other
negative ramifications for employees.119
Employees’ disclosure of confidential or other proprietary information
also can create potential liability for employers, thus motivating employers
to monitor workers in order to prevent these disclosures. For example, an
“[e]mployee[‘s] mishandling of electronic files could also result in
improper disclosure of customers’ private information or other security
breaches[.]”120 In one fairly unusual case, the personal information of Shell
Oil Company employees in dangerous parts of the world was leaked to a
blogger and subsequently published, posing a threat to the lives and wellbeing of these workers.121 Had harm befallen any of the workers whose
information was made public, Shell might have been concerned about its
own liability for failing to prevent this leak from taking place. Similar
arguments about the need to prevent harms caused by leaked information
have been cited by Wall Street to justify its efforts at snooping: In opposing
the rash of new legislation that limits employer access to employees’ social
media accounts, securities regulators have expressed concern that “the raft
of new laws aimed at protecting employees’ privacy puts investors at

employee misuse of electronic communications will . . . giv[e] rise to charges of racial or
sexual harassment . . . .”) (citation omitted); see also Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 443
(stating that inappropriate emails may serve as evidence in sexual harassment and/or
discrimination suits) (citation omitted).
116. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 79 (Vintage Books 2001) (2000) (discussing the privacy of employees’
communications in the workplace).
117. Rosenberg, supra note 13,, at 443-44.
118. See id. at 443 (describing the exposure to litigation caused by e-mail misuse); see
also Ciocchetti, supra note 13,, at 285 (emphasizing employers’ disdain for exposure to
liability caused by employees’ misuse of workplace technology).
119. See infra at Section IV.B.1 (concluding that an employer’s incentive for monitoring
extends beyond just preventing the creation of a sexually hostile environment, and that such
monitoring may be essential to forming an affirmative defense for any harassment claims
that ultimately are brought against the employer).
120. Kim, supra note 6, at 913 (citations omitted).
121. See Carlin, supra note 102 (discussing the possibility of kidnapping and insider
trading based on the leaked information).
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risk.”122 These regulators worry that the rapid dissemination of financial
advice on social networks like Facebook and Twitter “could create new
channels for Ponzi schemes and other frauds,”123 and argue that fighting
these frauds will be complicated by state laws that bar employers from
monitoring what their employees pitch to investors.124
Employers also might snoop into ostensibly private areas of their
employees’ (or, more typically, prospective employees’) lives out of a
concern over liability for negligent hiring. While the standards for
determining liability in this area may vary somewhat from one jurisdiction
to the next, most jurisdictions examine whether an employer knew, or
should have known, of an employee’s unfitness for a position or dangerous
propensities.125 In at least one jurisdiction, courts applying this standard
will focus on “the adequacy of the employer’s pre-employment
investigation into the employee’s background” in determining the
employer’s liability for negligent hiring.126 This emphasis on employers
conducting a “reasonable investigation” before hiring a new worker
provides further motivation for an employer to snoop as part of the hiring
process. What exactly constitutes a “reasonable investigation”? How
deeply should a prospective employer dig? An employer nowadays likely
would be expected at least to conduct a basic Internet search before hiring
an individual.127 Indeed, with so much information now available over the
Internet—and with Internet searches rapidly becoming a standard part of
the hiring process—an employer may appear negligent if it does not engage
in such pre-hiring “snooping.”128 If a candidate’s Facebook page is
plastered with images of him holding assault weapons, abusing small
animals, or snorting cocaine—and if the candidate then engages in similar
threatening or illegal activity once hired by an employer—a jury likely
would be hard-pressed to find that such readily-available clues would fall
outside the scope of the employer’s reasonable investigation.
Quite simply, employers need to know if a prospective or current
employee is a drug addict, a criminal, or has violent tendencies. If the
122. Eaglesham & Rothfeld, supra note 3.
123. Id.
124. See Id. ( “Wall Street’s self-regulator, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,
says financial firms need a way to follow up on ‘red flags’ suggesting misuse of a personal
account”).
125. See Weiss, supra note 78, at 18 (citing Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907,
911 (Minn. 1983)).
126. Weiss, supra note 78, at 18 (citing Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986)) (internal quotations omitted).
127. See supra notes 51-54, 97-100 and accompanying text.
128. See Weiss, supra note 78, at 18 (arguing that “[w]ith the prevalence of search
engine use to search for information, particularly information about a person, a plaintiff in a
negligent hiring case might indeed argue that propensities leading to the employee harming
the plaintiff could have been discovered by searching the web, SMS included”).
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easiest way to discover this information involves a bit of snooping, then
employers should be given a bit of latitude to pursue such channels.
Otherwise, employers will find themselves between a rock and a hard
place—responsible for protecting the health and safety of their workforce
and the public, but deprived of one of the most effective tools for
implementing this protection.
C.

Reputational Concerns as a Motivation for Snooping

Related both to the aforementioned financial motivations for snooping
and to concerns about potential legal liability, a third motivation behind
employers’ decision to snoop stems from employers’ reputational concerns.
Most employers likely have little interest in the details of their employees’
personal lives: they likely are not particularly intrigued by their
employees’ vacation photos, weekend plans, or Facebook posts about their
children’s latest witty statements. Rather, many employers may monitor
their employees’ out-of-work conduct out of a concern for how that
employee may be representing the employer. Is an employee making
disparaging statements about the employer? Is he or she disclosing
information that the employer would prefer to keep secret? Is the
employee mischaracterizing some part of the employer’s operations? Such
questions understandably would concern any employer.
The injection of technology into the workplace has raised the stakes
with respect to these reputational concerns, rendering an employer’s
reputation even more vulnerable than it was in the past. In the past,
employers could maintain tremendous control over virtually all
communications made on behalf of the company. Simply by controlling
employees’ access to the company’s pre-printed letterhead and stationery,
employers could limit the ability of an unauthorized employee to send
communications in the company’s name.129 Now, with email as the
dominant form of workplace communication (and with email accounts that
typically include an employer’s domain name or other identifying
information), employers have enabled virtually every employee to
communicate with others in the workforce (and with the outside world) in a
manner that bears the employer’s imprimatur.130 Moreover, in the past,
communications themselves generally were handwritten or typed with
deliberation and care, and were delivered by “snail mail” or, if urgent, by
hand.131
Now, with email emerging as the preferred form of
129. See Keane, supra note 51, at 91 (discussing how employers in the past could
control access to the ability to speak on the company’s behalf by controlling who could use
company letterhead and stationery).
130. See id. at 91-92.
131. See id. at 91.
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communication, employees communicate using far less care than in days
gone by. Instead of carefully typed or handwritten communications,
individuals frequently dash off email messages with far less reflection and
prudence, and then can disseminate that those messages to innumerable
outsiders with the mere push of a “send” button.”132 As one commentator
has observed, “the days of true [employer] control [over employee
communications] are relics of another era.”133
For employers, the impact of such cavalier communications on their
reputation can be devastating. In May 2008, for example, Angelo Mozilo,
then-CEO of Countrywide Financial, mistakenly replied to a distressed
debtor who had contacted Countrywide desperately seeking assistance with
mortgage restructuring.134 In his “misdirected” reply email, Mr. Mozilo
wrote, “This is unbelievable. Most of these letters now have the same
wording. Obviously they are being counseled by some other person or by
the Internet. Disgusting.”135 When Mr. Mozilo’s email ultimately was
widely circulated on the Internet and in the news media, it led to significant
embarrassment for Countrywide.136 An equally destructive situation (not
directly involving email) arose in April 2009, when two Domino’s Pizza
employees inflicted immeasurable damage upon their employer after
posting online several videos of unsanitary and disgusting acts engaged in
during the preparation of a customer’s pizza.137 After the video ultimately
went viral, Domino’s experienced a steep decline in its stock values.138 In
132. See id. (stating that “[e]mployees are able to communicate instantaneously and
with an audience of unlimited scope” and modern-day correspondence “is sent[] with the tap
of the Send button, often only seconds after the email or document is composed”).
133. Id.
134. See Janice Mac Avoy et al., Think Twice Before You Hit The Send Button!
Practical Considerations In The Use Of Email, PRAC. LAW, Dec. 2008 at 45, 46 (citation
omitted) (discussing the harm of inadvertently forwarding an impolite internal message to
the original sender).
135. Id. at 46.
136. See id (discussing the spread of the email online). For an additional example of a
negative email damaging an employer’s reputation, see Kim States, Oh the social lessons
learned when internal email goes viral, INSIDE TUCSON BUS (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://www.insidetucsonbusiness.com/news/profiles/oh-the-social-lessons-learned-wheninternal-email-goes-viral/article_e1343a86-4dc6-11e1-8f040019bb2963f4.html#.UTkeoXeTmyE.mailto (discussing the impact of a marketing firm’s
rude email exchange with a dissatisfied customer becoming public).
137. See Carlin, supra note 102 (discussing employers’ need to protect their businesses
against unlawful activity, including the fallout from two Domino’s Pizza employees
preparing a customer’s pizza in an unsanitary manner).
138. See id. (discussing decline in stock value as the fallout from the Dominos viral
video scandal); see also Kerry M. Lavelle, Why Every Employer Should Adopt a Social
Media
Networking Policy, CONSTR. EQUIP. DISTRIB. (Aug. 1, 2010),
http://www.cedmag.com/article-detail.cfm?id=10926254 (describing damage to reputation
of Burger King chain after video of Burger King employee taking bath in workplace sink
was electronically distributed to YouTube, MySpace, the health department, and to Burger
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this way, an employer’s hard-earned reputation can be shattered by careless
or malicious employee behavior, since email and other social media allow
an isolated incident of misconduct or poor judgment to become public
fodder. In the words of one commentator, “[n]ever before has so much
damage been accomplished by low level employees through mindless
behavior and social media.”139 By monitoring employee conduct in the
workplace, as well as communications that employees make about the
workplace, employers may be able to limit or even avoid this type of
damage.
Concerns about protecting their own reputations seem particularly
relevant in motivating employers to monitor their employees’ social media
postings.140 As noted above, employees frequently exhibit little inhibition
in posting a glut of information, including their employers’ confidential or
other proprietary information, on social media sites.141 Employees’ social
media postings may also spread negative aspersions about an employer,
such as in one recent case involving a police officer who posted
accusations of department corruption on her Facebook page. 142 Employers
have an interest in quelling this type of public disparagement Just as an
employee would expect his or her employer not to publicize on its
company Facebook page the results of the employee’s negative
performance review or the reasons for (or even mere fact of) the
King’s management).
139. Carlin, supra note 102.
140. See generally Lawrence E. Dubé, NLRB’s Solomon Tackles Social Media Cases,
Giving Wal-Mart Policy Revision a Green Light, DAILY LAB. REP., May 31, 2012, at AA-1,
available at http://www.bna.com/nlrbs-solomon-tackles-n12884909814/ (discussing the
significant attention the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) has devoted to crafting
guidelines for employers to use in setting workplace policies for social media use); see also
Mercedes Colwin & Bran C. Noonan, Navigating the Social Media Policy Minefield,
GORDON & REES LLP (June 2012),
http://www.gordonrees.com/publications/viewPublication.cfm?contentID=2692 (advising
“[e]mployers looking to implement policies governing the use of social media by employees
in the workplace . . . to devise policies that do not conflict with the [NLRA], which may be
challenging to accomplish”); Michael O. Loatman, Attorney Says NLRB Appointments
Dispute Doesn’t Change Social Media Policies Advice, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 6, 2003, at
A-8 (citing the perspective of a practicing attorney in this area that the NLRB recently has
been “‘aggressive’ in policing social media policies,” frequently finding problems with
confidentiality provisions appearing in such policies, as well as with provisions that regulate
the “postings or public comments about [a] company,” or that bar “negative or disparaging
comments about [a] company”).
141. See supra notes 110-11 (discussing a recent study that exposed employees’
willingness to “friend” and discuss confidential business information with total strangers on
a social media site).
142. See Gresham v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2012 WL 1600439, *1
(N.D. Ga. May 7, 2012) (holding that police department did not violate police officer’s free
speech rights when it denied officer a promotion after she posted accusations of department
corruption on her Facebook page).
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employee’s termination, so too does the employer have the right to expect
its employees not to disparage the company in the online community.
D.

The “New Normal”: Advances in Technology and Changing
Employee Expectations as a Motivation for Snooping

One final reason for the increase in employer snooping is that this type
of behavior has become significantly easier to implement. First, as noted
above, technology has become an increasingly prevalent part of the modern
workplace,143 frequently making it less costly for employers to gather
information about prospective and current employees. With the increasing
availability of computer databases that contain millions of records of
personal data about individuals, the cost of searching these sources drops
for employers.144 One recent study conducted by a University of Denver
professor demonstrated just how easily (and inexpensively) a wealth of
personal information can be accessed by a third party: By providing some
minimal information and paying $29.95 to an online investigations
company, this professor was able to receive—within a mere 15 minutes—
an extensive personal dossier on himself.145 With such a wealth of
information available at such a low cost, searches that once resided in the
toolbox of only large and resource-rich companies now may seem feasible
to a broad range of employers.146
To a certain extent, these advances in technology create a cyclical
phenomenon, culminating in an attrition of privacy rights: the more
technology advances, the more that certain intrusions which once would
have seemed astonishing now may appear mundane—and even expected.
In the recent Quon case (discussed further below),147 for example, the
Supreme Court observed the extent to which social norms play a significant
role in shaping the reasonableness of an individual’s expectation of
privacy.148 According to the Court, “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of
communication and information transmission are evident not just in the

143. See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text (discussing employers’ use of the
Internet to gather information about prospective and current employees and to monitor the
activities of employees); see also Bentzen, supra note 6, at 1293 (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (stating that “[n]ew technology has been injected into the
workplace at an exponentially increasing rate over the last few decades”).
144. PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 48.
145. Sprague, supra note 5, at 88 (citation omitted).
146. Fact Sheet 16, supra note 48.
147. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the impact of City of Ontario v. Quon).
148. Keane, supra note 51, at 114.
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technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior.”149 In a
similar vein, Professor Jeffrey Rosen, a noted scholar in the area of privacy
law, has expressed surprise at the passivity with which Americans have
acceded to encroachments into their private lives, wondering about the
“tepid response to the increasing surveillance of our personal and private
life.”150 Employees seem to expect—and accept—that their employers are
engaging in some form of workplace monitoring. As technology makes it
easier for companies to do so, their employees’ expectations of privacy
decrease even further.151
One additional and related result of this increase in technology in the
workplace has been that areas of an employee’s life once deemed entirely
personal now have become fair game for employer scrutiny: the “personal”
has begun to blur with the “professional.”152 Employees use their
employer-provided cell phones to make personal calls or send personal
texts; they send work-related email from their personal home computer;
they may keep all of their appointments—personal and professional—on a
single electronic calendar.153 As one commentator observed, “[g]iven the
ubiquity of electronic communications in both business and social life, it is
unrealistic to expect that employees will never use employer-provided
systems to communicate about personal matters.”154 Yet once personal data
makes its way into the workplace—in particular, when such data is dragged
into the workplace by the employee him or herself—does the employer
have an obligation to ignore that information? While employees object
strenuously to what they see as employers snooping into their personal
lives, perhaps the problem is not an excessive snooping by employers, but
149. City of Ontario, California v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010); see also Noyce,
supra note 7, at 29 (stating that the “circumstances of the workplace and the actions taken
by the employer will dictate whether an employee’s expectation of privacy is reasonable”);
Sprague, supra note 5, at 86-88 (observing that there is a link between the degree of
surveillance Americans undergo and the increase in workplace monitoring).
150. Rosen, supra note 116, at 25.
151. Sprague, supra note 5, at 89.
152. See generally Kim, supra note 6, at 910-14 (citations omitted) (discussing how
technological advances blur the distinction between work and home); see also Noyce, supra
note 7, at 29 (noting the “growing use of technology in the workplace, [and] the feeble
boundaries between work and home”).
153. Kim, supra note 6, at 911-12 (citations omitted); see also Christine Neylon
O’Brien, The First Facebook Firing Case Under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act: Exploring the Limits of Labor Law Protection for Concerted Communication on Social
Media, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 29 (2011) (discussing how “[s]martphones and other
portable Internet data generators such as iPads, and even Internet hotspots incorporated into
motor vehicles, have encouraged the blurring of work and personal time such that people are
tethered to their devices, checking their work and personal messages wherever they are and
whatever else they are doing”); Rosen, supra note 116, at 84 (discussing how technology
has broken down boundaries between the home and the office).
154. See Kim, supra note 6, at 911 (citation omitted).
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rather an inability by employers to separate irrelevant personal information
from highly relevant, professional information.
Finally, not only has the amount of technology in the workplace
increased (along with individuals’ reaction to such technology), but the
manner in which employees conduct themselves overall has also evolved in
recent years. Individuals in all walks of life generally seem more willing to
live their lives on display, not only tolerating others’ efforts to monitor
their behavior, but in fact often encouraging such attention. Many of the
newest members of the workforce belong to the so-called “Facebook
Generation,” a group so identified because of its tendency to share the
minutiae of daily life with all of their hundreds of Facebook “friends.”155
According to one self-proclaimed member of this cohort, “[m]y generation
has long been bizarrely comfortable with being looked at, and as
performers on the Facebook stage, we upload pictures of ourselves cooking
dinner for our parents or doing keg stands at last night’s party; we are
reckless with our personal information.”156 Indeed, “[t]he new Internet
generation doesn’t seem to have the privacy hang ups or suspicions their
parents had about sharing information with strangers over the net.”157
In many ways, this over-sharing mentality facilitates and encourages
employer snooping. Not only does this open and permissive attitude
inherently make more information available to employers as employees
more freely share their personal data, but this demeanor also actively
undermines employees’ objections to employer snooping. To a certain
extent, individuals subject to monitoring seem to forget that the cameras or
other surveillance devices are there: examples abound of employees who
have been told that their email will be monitored, but who continue to send
offensive or inappropriate messages,158 or of individuals who “knew” that
155. See
What
is
the
Facebook
Generation?,
WISEGEEK,
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-the-facebook-generation.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2014)
(stating that the “Facebook generation is a title used to identify those who are growing up in
a world where the use of online social networking is common”); see also Kalena Jordan,
Social Networking and the Overshare Generation, SITEPRONEWS (Aug. 24, 2010),
http://www.sitepronews.com/2010/08/24/social-networking-and-the-overshare-generation/
(stating that “[t]he premise is that everyone in your social circle not only wants to know but
NEEDS to know when you are buying that tall frappuccino from @starbucks. That they
need to know precisely where you are and what you are doing every minute of the day.”).
156. Alice Mathias, The Fakebook Generation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/06/opinion/06mathias.html?_r=0.
157. Jordan, supra note 155.
158. See, e.g., Franklin v. MIQ Logistics, LLC, No. 10–2234–EFM, 2011 WL 3205774,
at *1, *2 (D. Kan. July 28, 2011) (describing inappropriate emails sent by employee despite
company policy informing employees that company could monitor computer usage,
including emails, without prior notice); Ernst v. Sumner Grp., Inc., 264 S.W.3d 669, 670-71
(Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that employee sent two inappropriate emails, including emails
with photographs of a naked man, a picture of a woman with her breast and nipple exposed,
and a racially-derogatory email, despite an email policy informing employees that they have
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they were on camera but nonetheless behaved in objectively embarrassing
ways.159 Others have written about the “innate tension between an
employee intentionally making information public and feeling that her
information is private.”160 Employees cannot have it both ways. They
cannot throw open the doors to their private lives, and then protest when
they do not like who enters. While employees may claim not to be
comfortable with employers monitoring their actions, their conduct often
tells a different story.161
IV. ROLE OF THE COURTS IN PERMITTING – AND PERHAPS
EVEN ENCOURAGING – SNOOPING
On top of the various legal and practical concerns that motivate
employers to snoop, the courts themselves have played a significant role in
encouraging this type of employer behavior. In some instances, the courts
have adopted a surprisingly permissive attitude toward employer snooping,
issuing decisions that leave employers with broad leeway to monitor
employees without any legal sanction. In a handful of cases, the courts
have gone even further, by actually creating strong incentives that
encourage employers to snoop.
A.

Uncertain Boundaries as Making Way for Employers to Snoop: The
Impact of City of Ontario v. Quon

One way in which the courts contribute to many employers’ decision
to snoop relates to their failure to create clear legal guidelines regarding
what employers can and cannot do in monitoring their workers. As
discussed in detail above, the modern workplace abounds with new and
“no expectation of privacy” in emails sent from the employer’s system).
159. In my Employment Law course, I refer to this as the “Real World Phenomenon,”
named after the popular MTV reality show. See MTV,
http://www.mtv.com/search/?q=real+world (featuring a reality show documenting strangers
selected to live together). See also Terry Morrow, Melissa Howard talks about ‘Real
World,’ THECABIN.NET (Nov. 3, 2000), http://thecabin.net/stories/110300/sty_1103000054.
html (commenting that despite knowing that cameras will record their every word and
movement throughout the season, cast members of that show repeatedly have claimed that,
after a while, they would “forget the camera is there.”); Wayne Laepple, Back in ‘The Real
World” [sic], THE DAILY ITEM (June 21, 2007),
http://dailyitem.com/0300_entertainment/x691265744/Back-in-The-Real-World (quoting a
former cast member’s advice that “[y]ou have to try to be real and forget the camera crew”).
160. Noyce, supra note 7, at 28-29.
161. One recent study purports to find that the vast majority of workers do not mind
being monitored by their employers. See Swisher, supra note 103, (claiming that “nine out
of 10 workers accept or welcome having their computer activities monitored by their
employers during work hours”).
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often cutting-edge technology—technology that has altered the manner in
which many employers do business.162 These technological developments
have outpaced the law in many respects, and courts are grappling with how
to fit these new devices and systems within their traditional “privacy”
jurisprudence.163 With respect to the hot-button issue of an employer’s
ability to monitor an employee’s Facebook postings, for example, one
federal judge recently observed that the courts “have not yet developed a
coherent approach” for determining what expectations of privacy
individuals may have in such postings.164 This legal grey area frequently
opens the door for employers to expand the extent to which they monitor
their workers, either because they do not believe that there are any hardand-fast rules that will prohibit this type of behavior, or because they
simply do not know where to fix the outer boundaries of acceptable
monitoring.
One telling example of the courts’ failure to set boundaries with
respect to employer monitoring arose in the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision
in City of Ontario, California. v. Quon. In Quon, the plaintiff, Jeff Quon,
was employed as a police sergeant and member of the Special Weapons
and Tactics Team of the City of Ontario, California Police Department.165
In 2001, the City provided Quon and several coworkers with alphanumeric
pagers to use in executing their work duties.166 Prior to acquiring and
distributing these pagers, the City had communicated to all employees a
“Computer Usage, Internet and E-Mail Policy” that stated, inter alia, that
the City “reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity
including e–mail and Internet use, with or without notice.”167 While this
policy did not explicitly apply to text messages, the City made clear to
employees, including Quon, that it would cover text messages as well.168
Shortly after the City distributed these pagers, Quon exceeded his
monthly text message character allotment, resulting in an additional fee for

162. See supra notes 51-71.
163. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 6, at 914 (noting that “[t]he current law of privacy is not
well equipped to address these developments in the workplace”); Carlin, supra note 102, at
1 (asserting that “[s]tate and federal common law and statutory protections developed during
the past twenty years . . . fail to provide adequate protection in light of technological
advances that make employer monitoring simple, cheap, and surreptitious.”); Sprague, supra
note 5, at 89-90 (focusing on “what happens when technology outstrips the law’s ability to
protect employees from it”); cf. Byrnside, supra note 34, at 459 (observing that “[t]his new
method of employer information gathering is extremely different from its predecessors”).
164. Ehling v. Monmouth Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D.N.J.
2012).
165. Quon, supra note 149, at 2624-25.
166. Id. at 2625.
167. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Id.
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the City – a practice that continued in subsequent months.169 While Quon’s
superior verbally represented that the City would not monitor employees’
text messages so long as the employees themselves paid any overage
fees,170 the City eventually requested and reviewed the transcripts of
messages sent by Quon and others (purportedly to determine the
sufficiency of the existing character limit associated with the pagers).171
Upon finding that the vast majority of messages sent by Quon during work
hours were not work-related, the Police Department disciplined Quon.172
Quon subsequently sued, claiming, inter alia, a violation of his privacy
rights under both the Stored Communications Act and the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution.173
In examining the validity of Quon’s claims, the Supreme Court
significantly declined to decide a very basic question: Whether Quon
actually possessed any “reasonable expectation of privacy in the text
messages sent” over his employer-provided pager.174 Noting that “[t]he
Supreme Court must proceed with care when considering the whole
concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic
equipment owned by a government employer[,]”175 the Court simply
assumed that such a reasonable expectation of privacy existed and
proceeded accordingly, ultimately holding that the City’s conduct did not
violate Quon’s supposed “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the pager
because the City’s search was motivated by a legitimate work purpose and
was not excessive in scope.176
In some respects, one can understand the Supreme Court’s reluctance
to stake out a position regarding whether an employee in fact should be
deemed to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an employerprovided pager or similar device. Noting the “[r]apid changes in the
169. Id. at 2625-26.
170. Id. at 2625.
171. Id. at 2626.
172. Id.
173. Notably, Quon arose in a government workplace, where employees’ privacy rights
may differ substantially from those applicable to private sector workers. See supra note 6.
However, as many have observed, this case can be seen as a signal for how a court would
analyze a similar dispute in the private sector. See, e.g., Unanimous U.S. Supreme Court
Ruling in “Quon” Highlight Importance of Employer Technology-Usage and Privacy
Policies,
GIBSON,
DUNN
&
CRUTCHER
LLP
(June
18,
2010),
http://gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/USSupremeCourtRulinginQuon.aspx,
(noting
that “[a]lthough Quon involved a government employer, the importance of employment
policies clearly eliminating expectations of privacy in communications made on employerowned devices or systems is equally applicable to private-sector employers”); cf. Secunda,
supra note 6 (arguing that the Court’s decision in Quon functions to reduce privacy rights of
public sector employees to the level of employees in the private sector).
174. Quon, supra note 149, at 2630.
175. Id. at 2629.
176. Id. at 2630-33.
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dynamics of communication and information transmission[,]” the Court
correctly observed that it likely would encounter “difficulty predicting how
employees’ privacy expectations will be shaped by those changes or the
degree to which society will be prepared to recognize those expectations as
reasonable.”177 Yet by failing to make clear to employers and employees
what amount of privacy (if any) they should expect in these types of
devices, the Court arguably made it easier for employers to increase their
scrutiny in this area: If employers can assume that employees may not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in an employer-provided device, then
they likely will exhibit less hesitation in monitoring its use. In other words,
given the numerous very real concerns that motivate employers to snoop,
many employers–in the absence of a “no” from the Supreme Court-will
choose to take their chances and expand their monitoring of employees.
This idea that ambiguity from the Supreme Court could lead to
increased monitoring by employers is more than mere academic
speculation. In the wake of the Quon decision, various law firms that
represent employers sent updates to their clients, advising them regarding
how the Court’s decision in Quon might enable them to engage in a similar
type of monitoring. Citing the Court’s observation that “employer policies
concerning communications will . . . shape the reasonable expectations of
their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are clearly
communicated,”178 many employer-side law firms simply advised their
clients to do things like “expressly include all forms of electronic
communications in written technology-usage and privacy policies, and to
ensure that these policies are clearly communicated and consistently
applied.”179 According to these advisors, it seems, the Court’s failure to
draw a clear line in Quon regarding the actual scope of an employee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in employer-provided devices means that
employers wishing to snoop into communications made on such devices
simply must draft, publish and disseminate a clear warning to employees
that such monitoring will occur – not a particularly heavy burden for

177. Id. at 2629-30.
178. Quon, supra note 149, at 2630.
179. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, supra note 173; see City of Ontario vs. Quon: The
Supreme Court Weighs In On Employee Privacy Expectations, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
(June 23, 2010), http://www.dorsey.com/eu_le_ontariovsquon_062310/ (including in its
“practical guidance” for employers advice regarding how effectively to expand the scope of
an employer’s communications/ monitoring policy); Supreme Court Unanimously Upholds
Employer Ability to Access and Search Employee Messages Under Reasonable
Circumstances, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (June 23, 2010), http://www.sidley.com/SupremeCourt-Unanimously-Upholds-Employer-Ability-to-Access-and-Search-EmployeeMessages-Under-Reasonable-Circumstances-06-23-2010/ (“Clear policies should be
established and implemented to ensure that monitoring and searches are reasonable in the
given circumstances”).
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employers.180 All it takes to strip employees of their privacy rights is a bit
of notice.
B.

Court-Created Incentives for Employers to Snoop: The Court’s
Hostile Environment and Third-Party Retaliation Jurisprudence

While the courts’ failure to establish concrete limits on monitoring in
cases like Quon arguably make it permissible for employers to snoop,
several decisions by the Supreme Court have gone even further. In some
instances, the Court has rendered decisions and established legal doctrines
that not only have “opened the door” to snooping by employers, but in fact
have provided strong incentives for employers to snoop.
1.

How Hostile Environment Cases Encourage Employer Snooping

One way in which the courts actively have encouraged employers to
monitor employees relates to the courts’ jurisprudence in cases dealing
with workplace sexual harassment. As previously discussed, many
employers harbor concerns about employees using the employers’
equipment in an inappropriate manner. Employees may use their
workplace email account or Internet access to post pornographic, obscene
180. See Lazar, supra note 51, at 387 (stating that in applying the Quon Court’s analysis
to the private sector, “courts looking at privacy policies will likely assess whether the policy
is written and communicated clearly, with appropriate notice to employees”). Notably, the
Supreme Court is not the only entity guilty of injecting ambiguity into the scope of
employee’s privacy rights and employers’ ability to monitor employees. The NLRB
recently has been grappling with a similar issue, focusing on whether and how employers
can regulate their employees’ social media usage. See Dubé, supra note 140 (describing the
NLRB’s report regarding employees’ social media activities). Among other guidance, the
NLRB warned against overbroad social media policies and advised employers not to
implement policies that might “chill” employees in their right to engage in concerted
activities. See id. However, several commentators (generally practitioners representing
employers) have criticized the NLRB’s position as unnecessarily ambiguous and
inconsistent in its application of the NLRA to these social media policies. See Parent, supra
note 68, at *7 (arguing that “[t]here has been some inconsistency with respect to the
NLRB’s decisions in this area”); see also Social Media Policies And The NLRB: What
Employers Need To Know, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Mar. 1, 2013),
http://www.fenwick.com/Publications/Pages/Social-Media-Policies-And-The-NLRB-WhatEmployers-Need-To-Know.aspx (stating that “the NLRB’s memoranda and decisions
provide the only real guidance regarding the intersection between social media and Section
7 rights; unfortunately, this guidance is not intuitive for employers, at times seems
inconsistent, and can be difficult to interpret”); Christopher P. Calsyn & Kris D. Meade,
Uncertain Advice In NLRB’s Social Media Memorandum, LAW360 (June 26, 2012),
http://www.crowell.com/files/Uncertain-Advice-In-NLRBs-social-Media-Memoranda.pdf
(observing that “[a] close review of the [NLRB’s] May 30 report reveals continued
inconsistent treatment of employer policies, both within this report and when compared to
Solomon’s earlier reports”).
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or other otherwise harassing images and messages.181 Employees likewise
may use social media sites to send sexually explicit or otherwise
inappropriate messages to coworkers.182 This type of conduct not only
could create distractions in the workplace and undermine employee morale,
but it also might create liability for the employer under Title VII’s 183
prohibition against workplace harassment by creating a “hostile working
environment” for employees.184
Under Title VII, employers have a legal obligation to take various
steps to prevent and eliminate harassing behavior in the workplace.185 In
many cases, employers must do more than simply wait for employees to
come forward with complaints about harassing behavior before reacting to
those complaints. Rather, employers frequently possess an affirmative
obligation to prevent and eliminate harassing behavior. In its twin
decisions of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton186 and Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth,187 the Supreme Court held that an employer may have
vicarious liability to an employee who is subjected to unlawful harassment
by a supervisor with authority over that employee.188 According to the
Court, however, if the supervisor’s conduct did not result in a tangible
employment action for the employee in question (i.e., a termination,
demotion, or other negative change in the terms and conditions of
employment), the employer may be able to avoid some or all of its liability
if the employer can show (i) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior; and (ii) that the
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or otherwise to avoid the
harm.189 In other words, an employer taking this type of preventative
action can assert an affirmative defense against sexual harassment liability.
But, if an employer’s defense in these types of hostile environment
cases will depend, inter alia, on its efforts to “prevent and promptly
correct” any sexually harassing behavior, how should the employer go
about availing itself of this defense? What steps should the employer take

181. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
182. See id.
183. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2005), amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42
U.S.C. § 1981a (2005) (“Title VII”).
184. See Sprague, supra note 5, at 112-13 (citations omitted); see also Ciocchetti, supra
note 13, at 285 (citation omitted).
185. See generally Enforcement Guidance for Vicarious Employer Liability for
Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
June 18, 1999, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html.
186. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
187. Id.
188. See Sprague, supra note 5, at 112.
189. Id.
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to learn about this inappropriate behavior in the first place, and then to
ensure that the behavior does not continue? The most effective way for an
employer to do so will be by monitoring employee behavior.
Notably, in his dissent in Ellerth, Justice Thomas seemed to predict
the extent to which this affirmative defense could incentivize employers to
monitor their employees. Thomas argued that “[s]exual harassment is
simply not something that employers can wholly prevent without taking
extraordinary measures – constant video and audio surveillance, for
example – that would revolutionize the workplace in a manner
incompatible with a free society.”190 Privacy scholar Jeffrey Rosen has
expressed a similar concern, arguing that “[b]ecause it is difficult to know
in advance what kind of sexually related behavior or speech a reasonable
juror might find hostile or offensive, prudent employers have a strong
incentive to monitor and punish far more private speech and conduct than
the law actually forbids.”191 Indeed, according to Rosen, the courts have
“creat[ed] a liability regime where monitoring of employees’ speech and
behavior is a matter of corporate self-interest.”192
If employers have an obligation to prevent harassing behavior in the
workplace – and in fact, can avoid liability by showing that they took
appropriate steps to do so – then one would expect them to use all readily
available tools to fulfill this obligation. In many instances, that may mean
monitoring employees’ email, Internet usage, social media posts and other
behaviors, to make sure that inappropriate language and/or conduct is not
entering the workplace. In this way, by providing employers with a
tremendous legal advantage (and thus, indirectly, a financial benefit) linked
to finding out about inappropriate workplace conduct, the Court actively
encourages employers to monitor their employees.
2.

How the Court’s Third-Party Retaliation Jurisprudence
Encourages Employer Snooping

A more subtle example of the Supreme Court providing employers
with an incentive to snoop arose in the January 2011 case Thompson v.
North American Stainless, LP.193 In Thompson, the plaintiff, Eric
190. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 770, (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also
Rosen, supra note 116, at 80 (“Most people are surprised to learn that sexual harassment law
does not impose liability on sexual harassers. Instead, it puts the full weight of
responsibility on their employers”).
191. Rosen, supra note 116, at 13.
192. Id. at 79.
193. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S.Ct. 863 (2011) (rev’d S.Ct. 863 (2011)).
This Section draws upon ideas previously explored in this author’s earlier work, Jessica
Fink, Protected by Association? The Supreme Court’s Incomplete Approach to Defining the
Scope of the Third-Party Retaliation Doctrine, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 521 (2011) (examining
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Thompson, worked for the defendant North American Stainless, LP
(“North American”), as did his then-fiancée Miriam Regalado.194
Thompson claimed that shortly after Regalado filed a discrimination charge
against North American, North American terminated Thompson’s
employment.195 According to Thompson, North American fired him solely
in retaliation for Regalado’s protected activity.196
Thompson’s claim implicated an area of jurisprudence under Title VII
known as the “third-party retaliation doctrine.” In a “typical” retaliation
case, a plaintiff will claim (i) that he or she engaged in some “protected
activity” for purposes of Title VII; 197 (ii) that he or she suffered some
adverse employment action; and (iii) that there is some causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse action.198 Thus, an
employee might assert a retaliation claim if he was fired or denied a
promotion because he had engaged in some “protected activity,” perhaps
by filing a charge of discrimination or bringing a Title VII lawsuit against
his or her employer.199
Third-party retaliation claims are slightly different. Third-party
retaliation claims generally arise when an employee claims to have
received adverse treatment from an employer not due to any conduct
engaged in by that employee himself, but rather due to conduct engaged in
by another employee. “For example, Joe Senior gets fired because his son,
Joe Junior, filed a discrimination charge against their mutual employer;
Thompson and its potential impact on both employers and employees).
194. See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 806 (holding that employee who was terminated after
his fiancée filed gender discrimination charge was not a member of a protected class and
Title VII does not create a cause of action for third-party retaliation for persons who have
not personally engaged in protected activity).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. There are two categories of “protected activity” recognized for purposes of a
retaliation claim under Title VII. First, the “participation clause” within Title VII’s
retaliation provision prohibits employers from taking adverse action against employees who
“ha[ve] made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner” in the investigation
or litigation of any discrimination complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Second, the
“opposition clause” of the statute protects employees who have “opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
198. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-58 (3rd Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted) (reversing lower court dismissal because plaintiff presented a cognizable claim
against his employer); Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 969 (9th Cir.
2002) (citation omitted) (holding that employee established a prima facie case of retaliation
under Title VII by showing a causal connection between involvement in a protected activity
and adverse employment action).
199. See e.g., Decker v. Andersen Consulting, 860 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(allowing retaliation claim to proceed where employee presented genuine issue of material
fact that employer reduced her responsibilities and terminated her employment in response
to her filing EEOC charge of discrimination and informing employer of intent to pursue
discrimination claim).
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Wendy Wife is demoted because her spouse and coworker, Harry Husband,
called the EEOC to report workplace discrimination.”200 These situations
represent a twist on the traditional retaliation claim that Title VII allows.
Thompson’s claim in suing North American was essentially this:
Thompson did not claim that he personally engaged in any protected
activity, such as by assisting Regalado in filing her discrimination charge
or otherwise opposing North American’s alleged treatment of Regalado.201
Rather, Thompson explicitly alleged in his complaint “that his ‘relationship
to Miriam Thompson [nee Regalado] was the sole motivating factor in his
termination.’”202 While many courts – including every federal court of
appeals to consider the issue – previously had held that claims of “thirdparty retaliation” fell outside of Title VII’s retaliation provision,203 the U.S.
Supreme Court in Thompson ultimately decided that this claim could
proceed, finding that Thompson could allege a third-party retaliation claim
based upon Regalado’s protected activity.204
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court inadvertently may
have created a strong incentive for employers to snoop. While the Court
held that Title VII would permit third-party retaliation claims, it expressly
declined to provide any specific guidance regarding what types of
relationships that could support these types of claims.205 Instead, the Court
merely stated that lower courts should examine the “particular
circumstances” in any given case to determine whether to recognize a claim
of third-party retaliation,206 emphasizing only that “the provision’s standard
for judging harm must be objective,” as opposed to relying upon a
plaintiff’s subjective feelings.207 In other words, the Court held that Title
VII (sometimes) would permit third-party retaliation claims, without
outlining any guidelines defining the scope of such claims.208
Ironically, the Court adopted this rather broad view despite the fact
200. See Fink, supra note 193, at 526-27 (discussing the assertion of third-party
retaliation claims under Title VII).
201. See Thompson, supra note 194, at 805-06 (observing that Thompson did not claim
that he personally engaged in any protected activity).
202. Id. at 806; see also id. at 808 (observing that Thompson’s “Statement of the Issue”
on appeal and “Statement of Facts” also made clear that Thompson’s retaliation claim was
based upon the protected activity of his fiancée, as opposed to any activity that he engaged
in himself).
203. See Fink, supra note 193, at 527-28 (citations omitted) (discussing the approach
taken by federal courts prior to Thompson in denying third-party retaliation claims).
204. Thompson, supra note 193, at 867.
205. See id. at 868. (“We must also decline to identify a fixed class of relationships for
which third-party reprisals are unlawful.”).
206. Id.
207. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (parenthesis in original).
208. See Fink, supra note 193, at nn.52-56 and accompanying text (citations omitted)
(explaining the Court’s decision in Thompson).
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that, during the oral argument of this case, several justices appeared to fret
about the boundaries of the third-party retaliation doctrine. For example,
Justice Alito questioned Thompson’s counsel, asking “[s]uppose
Thompson were not Regalado’s fiancée at the time. Suppose they were . . .
just good friends . . . . The way the company wanted to get at her was by
firing her friend. Would that be enough?”209 Advocating for what he
referred to as a “clear line” in this area, Justice Alito observed, “I can
imagine a whole spectrum of cases in which there is a lesser relationship
between these two persons, and . . . unless there’s a clear line there
someplace, this theory is rather troubling.”210 Chief Justice Roberts
expressed similar concerns, inquiring of the Deputy Solicitor General (who
also was arguing in favor of Thompson), “[h]ow are we supposed to tell, or
how is an employer supposed to tell, whether somebody is close enough or
not?”211
Among the many possible ramifications from the Court’s intentional
lack of clarity in this case regarding the scope of the third-party retaliation
doctrine,212 one notable concern is the extent to which this ambiguity has
the potential to erode employee privacy. By merely stating that employers
might be liable for taking adverse action against an employee if the
employee has a “sufficiently close relationship” with a coworker who has
engaged in protected activity – and by not elaborating on what types of
relationships will satisfy this criterion – the Court forces employers to
potentially make important employment decisions based upon incomplete
information. A cautious employer might want to assume that a court will
give this doctrine the broadest possible scope, encompassing even
relatively casual relationships within the ambit of the doctrine. Thus, in
order to assess the risk of taking adverse action against an employee, such a
risk-averse employer may want to know, prior to taking adverse action
against an employee, all of the workplace relationships of that employee—
whether the employee is married to, dating, or perhaps mere lunchroom
buddies with a coworker who previously engaged in some protected
activity. As Justice Alito observed during the oral arguments in Thompson
(despite ultimately signing on to the Majority’s decision):
Put yourself in the – in the shoes of an employer, and you . . .
want to take an adverse employment action against employee A.
You think you have good grounds for doing that, but you want –
209. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S.
Ct. 863 (2011) (No. 09-291) [hereinafter “Thompson Oral Argument Transcript”].
210. Id. at 12.
211. Id. at 20.
212. See generally Fink, supra note 193, at 561-66 (arguing that the Court should have
provided a more detailed framework regarding the factors to be used in conducting analyses
of third-party retaliation claims).
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before you do it, you want to know whether you’re potentially
opening yourself up to a retaliation claim. Now, what is the
employer supposed to do then? They say . . . we need to survey
everybody who is engaged in protected conduct, and now we
need to see whether this person who we’re thinking of taking the
adverse employment action against has a . . . ‘close relationship’
with any of those people.213
In this way, the Court’s failure to set clear boundaries regarding the
scope of the third-party retaliation doctrine gives employers a strong
incentive to snoop. Those employers who are able to ferret out their
employees’ personal workplace relationships may minimize (or at least get
an early handle on) the potential liability associated with some
contemplated adverse action – a high-value result for many employers.
While employees may find these inquiries into their private lives
troublesome and intrusive, the Supreme Court has created a framework that
actively encourages this type of behavior by employers.
V.

OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON SNOOPING EMPLOYERS

While employers frequently possess strong incentives to snoop and
often do so for legitimate reasons, that does not mean that they should have
unfettered access to all aspects of their employees’ private lives. To the
contrary, in permitting some monitoring by employers, the courts should
establish clear limits on when and how employers can monitor lawfully.
Perhaps the most significant limit that should be placed on monitoring
by employers relates to employers’ motivations for snooping: Simply
because employers can snoop does not always mean that they should.
Rather, employers wishing to investigate prospective or current employees
should have to provide a legitimate justification for doing so. Indeed,
courts could adopt the analytical framework used in disparate impact
discrimination claims. There, once an employee has shown that an
employer has a policy or practice that has a disparate impact on members
of a particular racial group (or other protected class), the employer has the
burden of proving that the policy or practice in question is job related for
the particular position at issue and consistent with business necessity.214 If
the employer meets this burden, then the burden will shift to the plaintiff to
show that there is a less discriminatory alternative that meets the business
need and that the employer refuses to adopt that alternate approach.215
Courts could adopt a similar approach to claims of unwarranted
213. Thompson Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 209, at 17-18.
214. EEOC Compliance Manual § 15-V.B at 21, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
Mar. 19, 2006, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html#VB.
215. Id. at 21-22 (citation omitted).
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employer snooping. Once an employee demonstrated that a policy or
practice by his or her employer intruded into an area in which the employee
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy, the court could require the
employer to show that the intrusion was related to the position in question
and that the monitoring was serving a real business need. If the employer
could satisfy this burden, then the plaintiff could only prevail by
establishing a less intrusive manner for gathering the information in
question and showing that the employer had declined to adopt this less
restrictive approach.
For example, a private high school might adopt a policy barring
teachers and other staff from “friending” any current students on Facebook,
and might require covered employees to allow the school administration to
review periodically the complete list of their Facebook “friends.” If a
teacher or staff member claimed that this policy violated his or her
reasonable expectations of privacy, the school could argue a legitimate
business need to avoid any appearance of impropriety or favoritism by
staff. The objecting employee then would have to argue that the school
could accomplish this goal through less intrusive means (such as by
including in the contracts for applicable teachers and staff a provision in
which they agreed not to “friend” any students).
In addition to justifying the reason for an intrusion, employers should
also be required to take steps to verify any information that they receive
before acting on it, particularly when gathering information as part of the
hiring process. While technological advances and increased monitoring
may greatly expand the amount of information available to employers, the
quality of that information is often questionable at best.216 As discussed
above, “traditional” information gathering tools such as honesty tests and
other psychological exams are of dubious reliability.217 Moreover,
background checks or general Internet searches may turn up information
about the wrong individual, especially if the candidate or employee has a
fairly common name.218 In one case, a woman interviewing for a job as a
sales clerk was denied the position after a criminal record check turned up
arrest records for criminal prostitution and drug possession – arrest records
that actually belonged to a different individual with the same name.219 In
another incident, a man on the brink of being hired for a truck driving job
216. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 49 (describing the denial of employment to an
applicant based on an erroneous shoplifting report).
217. See Stabile, supra note 42 and accompanying text.
218. See Josh Brodesky, Background Checks Prone to Mistakes, Can Shut Out Jobs,
USA TODAY (Nov. 20, 2012, 1:20 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/11/20/background-screening-gonewrong/1716439/ (highlighting the question of the accuracy of background checks especially
in cases where a person has a common name).
219. See Wells, supra note 49 (describing the case of Katrina Haines).
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lost the position after a background check incorrectly labeled him a
convicted pedophile.220 Even an individual’s own Facebook account may
contain misleading or inaccurate information, given the ability of anyone to
“tag” another individual in a posting or photograph, often without that
individual’s knowledge or consent.221
In the context of employee references, as discussed above, employers
enjoy a qualified privilege to provide information to another employer, so
long as the employer does not communicate false information about an
employee “with malice.”222 However, perhaps the courts should impose
more stringent obligations on the employer-recipients of this and other
information, requiring employers to make reasonable efforts to confirm the
accuracy of any information before using it as the basis for an adverse
employment decision. In so doing, the courts could strike a proper balance
between allowing employers broad latitude to gather information about
their employees and applicants, while providing some protection against
employees suffering harm from false or misleading information.
CONCLUSION
The debate over the proper scope of employee privacy in the
workplace will continue to attract significant attention in years to come.
According to a recent study by the U.S. Department of Labor Wage and
Hour Division, laws addressing worker privacy were among the most
common new pieces of labor and employment legislation enacted by states
in 2012.223 As a competitive business climate renders employers
220. See Olivera Perkins, Errors in Background Checks Cost Job Seekers, PLAIN
DEALER (Dec. 15, 2012, 8:03 PM),
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2012/12/job_applicants_lose_out_as_err_1.ht
ml.
221. Paul Boutin, How to Block Facebook Photos of Yourself, N.Y. TIMES GADGETWISE
(May 5, 2009, 7:40 PM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/how-to-blockfacebook-photos-of-yourself/ (“There is no way to prevent someone from tagging a photo
with either your username, or your name as a tag. What’s possible is you can prevent other
users from searching for photos of you.”); see also Jenna Wortham, New Facebook Location
Feature Sparks Privacy Concerns, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Aug. 18, 2010, 9:44 PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/new-facebook-location-feature-sparks-privacyconcerns/ (highlighting an application called Facebook Places that allows users to “tag” an
accompanying friend and post his or her location to Facebook).
222. See Befort, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
223. See John J. Fitzpatrick, Jr. & James L. Perrine, State labor legislation enacted in
2012, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 24 (Feb. 2013) (tabling all enacted state labor legislation for
2012); see also States Targeted Worker Privacy, Trafficking In Labor Legislation Last Year,
DOL Reports, 47 DAILY LAB. REP. A-7 (Mar. 5, 2013) (“For the second consecutive year,
the most legislative activity came in the worker privacy category, as 30 bills related to the
subject were passed in 20 states during 2012.”). Legislators passed 31 worker privacyrelated laws in 20 states in 2011. Id.
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increasingly more concerned about protecting their financial assets,
proprietary information, reputation, and other resources—and as
technological advancements make it progressively easier for employers to
engage in novel methods of monitoring their employees—questions about
the limits on employer snooping will continue to occupy a dominant place
in our legal, social, and political conversations.
This article is not intended as a defense of every action that an
employer may take to gather information about a prospective or current
employee. Without a doubt, abuses of employee privacy can and do occur.
The limited privacy rights applicable to private sector employees means
that employers have significant latitude with respect to the actions that they
legally can take in monitoring their workers. However, there may be many
situations where simply because an employer legally can engage in a
particular type of monitoring, it might not be prudent or proper for the
employer to do so. This article has not discussed the negative impact on
morale that might result from extensive employer snooping—an impact
that might be substantial in some cases.224 Nor has this article discussed
whether there are certain areas of an employee’s private life that simply
should remain off limits to snooping from a moral perspective.225
The purpose of this article is to put the “problem” of employee
snooping in a more realistic and nuanced context. With the media in an
uproar over alleged privacy invasions by employers, with legislators
responding with predictable bluster, and with members of the public
predictably confused about their rights, there is some benefit to putting this
putative problem in perspective. Concerns about employees’ rights must
include consideration of the rights and responsibilities of employers as
well—the right of an employer to protect itself from financial injuries or
legal exposure; the responsibility to protect its shareholders from
unnecessary loss; the responsibility to protect its employees from a host of
224. See Jay P. Kean, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles
Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289, 320 (2002)
(detailing the impact of monitoring on employees’ psychology and on overall morale,
stating that monitoring “takes its toll on workers and companies in terms of stress, fatigue,
apprehension, motivation, morale, and trust; this results in increased absenteeism, turnover,
poorer management, and lower productivity, not to mention higher health-care costs. Thus,
monitoring may spoil the workplace environment, and it can have a detrimental effect on
productivity”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. See Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector:
Tortious and Ethical Aspects, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1263 (1993) (addressing the legal and moral
issues developing in the field of employee privacy); see also Bahaudin G. Mujtaba, Ethical
Implications of Employee Monitoring: What Leaders Should Consider, J. APPLIED MGMT. &
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, July 2003, at 22, available at
http://www.huizenga.nova.edu/Jame/articles/employee-monitoring.cfm (examining the
ethical implications of employee monitoring and recommending employers exercise
restraint).
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physical, mental, and other harms; and the responsibility to protect the
public from what might result if employers were to make important hiring
and other work-related decisions based upon dangerously incomplete
information. We cannot maintain a framework where a lack of information
subjects employers to significant risks and potential liability, and then
stymies employers’ reasonable efforts to gather that information in a
reasonable manner.

